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Socrates, Syllogisms, and Sadistic 
Transactions:  Challenges to Mastering U.C.C. 
Article 9 Through Deductive Reasoning 
Timothy R. Zinnecker* 
It is tragic that our law schools do not have an orientation course in 
logic.  We had that great line from Professor Kingsfield in The Paper 
Chase: “You come in here with a head full of mush and you leave 
thinking like a lawyer.”  The Socratic method is the most valuable tool 
to train students to think like a lawyer.  Yet the students—and 
unfortunately too many of their professors—apparently do not know 
the elements of deductive and inductive reasoning. 
     – Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert1 
INTRODUCTION2 
In 2007, an essay entitled “Logic for Law Students: How to 
Think Like a Lawyer” appeared in the University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review.3  The essay, co-authored by federal appellate judge 
Ruggero J. Aldisert and two of his law clerks, opens with this 
statement: “Logic is the lifeblood of American law.”4  Prompted 
by Professor Kingsfield’s famous line above,5 the co-authors then 
 
* Harry and Helen Hutchens Research Professor, South Texas College of Law 
(tzinnecker@stcl.edu).  Several friends were generous with their time and offered helpful 
comments on an early draft, including John Blevins, Steve Clowney, John Dolan, Sharon 
Finegan, Adam Gershowitz, Ken Kettering, Bob Lloyd, Dru Stevenson, and Steve Ware.  
My employer graciously provided financial support. 
1 See Howard J. Bashman, 20 Questions for Senior Circuit Judge Ruggero J. 
Aldisert of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, http://howappealing.law.com/ 
20q/2003_07_01_20q-appellate-blog_archive.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
2 Much of the text and many of the accompanying footnotes in the Introduction and 
Part I of this article will also appear in the companion article referenced infra at note 15 
and accompanying text. 
3 Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Logic for Law Students:  How to Think Like a Lawyer, 
69 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
4 Aldisert, supra note 3, at 1.  Not every federal appellate judge concurs.  See 
Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 833–34 (1988) 
(suggesting that “the life of the law really cannot be logic”).  Cf. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic;; it has been experience.”). 
5 The oft-quoted line is from the following soliloquy delivered by Professor Charles 
Kingsfield to his first-year contracts class at Harvard Law School: 
The study of law is something new and unfamiliar to most of you—unlike any 
schooling you have ever been through before.  We use the Socratic method 
here: I call on you, ask you a question, and you answer it.  Why don’t I just give 
you a lecture?  Because through my questions you learn to teach yourselves.  
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ask, “What is thinking like a lawyer?”  They offer this response: 
“It means employing logic to construct arguments.”6  The authors 
contend that “our law schools do not give students an orientation 
in the principles of logic,”7 which, in their opinion, “does violence 
to the essence of the law.”8  They then express the essay’s 
purpose: 
[W]e endeavor to explain, in broad strokes, the core principles of logic 
and how they apply in the law school classroom.  Our modest claim is 
that a person familiar with the basics of logical thinking is more likely 
to argue effectively than one who is not.  We believe that students who 
master the logical tenets laid out in the following pages will be better 
lawyers and feel more comfortable when they find themselves caught 
in the spotlight of a law professor on a Socratic binge.9 
The authors then expound on these “core principles of logic,” 
discussing for several pages both deductive reasoning through 
syllogisms10 and inductive reasoning by analogy.11 
I teach Secured Transactions12 once (and sometimes two or 
three times) each year.  The course introduces students to many 
of the legal rules that govern transactions in which personal 
property (rather than real estate) secures payment of a financial 
obligation.  Particular attention is given to U.C.C. Article 913 and 
selected provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.14 
 
Through this method of questioning, answering, questioning, answering, we 
seek to develop in you the ability to analyze that vast complex of facts that 
constitute the relationships of members within a given society.  Questioning 
and answering.  At times, you may feel that you have found the correct answer.  
I assure you that this is a total delusion on your part.  You will never find the 
correct, absolute, and final answer.  In my classroom, there is always another 
question, another question to follow your answer.  Yes, you’re on a treadmill.  
My little questions spin the tumblers of your mind.  You’re on an operating 
table; my little questions are the fingers probing your brain.  We do brain 
surgery here.  You teach yourselves the law, but I train your mind.  You come 
in here with a skull full of mush, and you leave thinking like a lawyer. 
The Paper Chase (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).  For his portrayal of the “stuffy, crusty, 
brilliant, and despotic” law professor, the 71-year-old John Houseman received the Oscar 
for Best Supporting Actor.  See 1973 Academy Awards Winners and History, 
http://www.filmsite.org/aa73.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
The movie was based on the book of the same title, published in 1970, and authored 
by John Jay Osborn, Jr., who, coincidentally, clerked on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit during the 1971–72 term, during Judge Aldisert’s tenure.  
THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 872 (2007–08). 
6 Aldisert, supra note 3, at 1. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. (footnote omitted). 
10 Id. at 3–12. 
11 Id. at 16–20. 
12 Some of my customers prefer the moniker “Sadistic Transactions” (hence the 
title). 
13 One commercial law professor describes Article 9 as “the crowning achievement of 
the UCC project, and perhaps of the entire uniform law enterprise.”  See Edward J. 
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This article, together with a companion article (Syllogisms, 
Enthymemes, and Fallacies: Mastering Secured Transactions 
Through Deductive Reasoning15), respond to Judge Aldisert’s 
co-authored plea for a renewed emphasis on logic and deductive 
reasoning in the classroom, from my perspective as a Secured 
Transactions professor.  Both articles begin with an introduction 
to the syllogism, the classic form of deductive reasoning.  But the 
two articles then travel different paths. 
Following Part I’s introduction to syllogistic analysis, Part II 
of this article offers seven reasons why Article 9 itself may hinder 
the effective use of syllogisms in a Secured Transactions course.16  
First, Article 9 occasionally redefines ordinary terms in an 
unconventional and counter-intuitive manner, which may lead 
students to reach logical, but incorrect, conclusions when crafting 
a syllogistic argument.  Second, Article 9 sometimes fails to warn 
the reader that compliance with a straightforward statutory 
provision may dictate a conclusion that is logical, yet yields 
disastrous consequences.  Third, Article 9 can lead to incorrect 
conclusions because selected rules cannot be read literally.  
Fourth, Article 9 occasionally adopts rules that are inconsistent 
with policy-based analysis, which may lead students to craft 
incorrect major premises and, accordingly, to reach erroneous 
conclusions.  Fifth, sometimes a rule of Article 9 triggers a result 
so unexpected and inconsistent with the norm that a logical 
approach to its understanding is undermined.  Sixth, Article 9 
occasionally adopts a rule that is so illogical as to render futile 
any attempt to understand it logically.  And seventh, many of the 
 
Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail:  Article 9, Capture, and the 
Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 571 (1998).  See also Lawrence Ponoroff & F. 
Stephen Knippenberg, Having One’s Property and Eating it Too:  When the Article 9 
Security Interest Becomes a Nuisance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 374 (2006) (“Powerful, 
creative, comprehensive yet elegant, Article 9 is generally regarded as the most 
innovative of the Code’s articles.”) (footnote omitted).  My students are not so effusive in 
their praise, often asking if Article 9 was drafted in a foreign language and then 
translated.  I hesitate to disclose to them that Grant Gilmore, the principal architect of 
Article 9, taught French at Yale University for a few years before enrolling in its law 
school at the age of 29.  See Robert M. Jarvis, Gilmore and Black at 50, 38 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 135, 139–40 (2007). 
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2006). 
15 The manuscript of the companion article will be circulated to law journals in 
spring 2010.  A pre-publication draft is available by contacting the author. 
16 Notwithstanding these statutory roadblocks, the companion article will contend 
that Secured Transactions is an ideal course in which legal principles can be introduced, 
analyzed, and mastered through deductive reasoning.  The article will illustrate—through 
ten examples covering each of the five major topics of the Secured Transactions course 
(attachment, perfection, priority, default, and bankruptcy)—how narrative analysis can 
be expressed as deductive syllogisms, and how deductive syllogisms can be the foundation 
for enhanced narrative analysis.  The article will also examine enthymemes (deductive 
reasoning which requires the audience to infer part of the argument) and review the 
formal fallacies which can undermine the logic of the syllogistic argument. 
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statutory rules of Article 9 are riddled with exceptions, 
frustrating the ability to easily craft the major premise of the 
syllogism.  The article then offers a brief conclusion (and a 
glimpse of hope). 
I.  DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND THE SYLLOGISM 
Judge Aldisert and his co-authors open their discussion of 
deductive reasoning by noting its widespread application, and 
thus its importance.  They suggest that “90 percent of legal 
issues can be resolved by deduction”17 and contend that 
“deductive reasoning . . . is the driving force behind most judicial 
opinions.”18  In their opinion, the form in which deductive 
reasoning most often appears is the syllogism—”a label logicians 
attach to any argument in which a conclusion is inferred from 
two premises.”19 
The authors then introduce the reader to syllogisms by 
offering “the immortal example of logicians everywhere”20: 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.21 
The first statement (“All men are mortal.”) is “the major 
premise,” which “states a broad and generally applicable truth.”22  
The second statement (“Socrates is a man.”) is “[t]he minor 
premise” and “states a specific and usually more narrowly 
applicable fact.”23  The third statement (“Therefore, Socrates is 
 
17 Aldisert, supra note 3, at 2. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Id.  See also LEWIS H. LARUE, GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF LAW:  AN INTRODUCTION 
172 (2nd ed. 2001) (“In the kingdom of law, the syllogism reigns supreme.”);; Daniel S. 
Goldberg, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means:  How Kripke and 
Wittgenstein’s Analysis on Rule Following Undermines Justice Scalia’s Textualism and 
Originalism, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 273, 276 (2006) (“The syllogism is perhaps the 
touchstone of modern legal method.”);; Amy E. Sloan, Erasing Lines:  Integrating the Law 
School Curriculum, 1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 3, 4 n.4 (2002) (“Whatever its 
shortcomings, however, syllogistic reasoning remains at the core of much legal analysis 
and is, in many respects, the starting point of a first-year law student’s education in law 
and argumentation.”). 
20 Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification:  Toward an 
Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 91 n.206 (1985). 
21 Aldisert, supra note 3, at 3.  This example (sometimes in a slightly different 
format) makes an occasional appearance in judicial opinions.  See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 
U.S. 656, 672–73 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 
1245 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert, et al. v. 
Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 4th 419, 430 (2003). 
22 Aldisert, supra note 3, at 4.  Cf.  PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 
TO LOGIC 260 (6th ed. 1997) (defining the “major term” as “the predicate of the conclusion” 
and the “minor term” as “the subject of the conclusion”). 
23 Aldisert, supra note 3, at 4. 
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mortal.”) is “the conclusion,” which “draws upon these premises 
and offers a new insight that is known to be true based on the 
premises.”24  The authors then reveal this important observation: 
[T]he three parts of a syllogism—the two premises and the 
conclusion—are themselves built from three units.  Logicians call 
these units “terms.”  Two terms appear in each statement: the “major 
term” in the major premise and conclusion, the “minor term” in the 
minor premise and conclusion, and the “middle term” in the major and 
minor premises but not in the conclusion.  Notice that the middle term 
covers a broad range of facts, and that if the conclusion is to be valid, 
the minor term must be a fact that is included within the middle term.  
Although the jargon can get confusing, the basic idea isn’t hard to 
grasp: Each statement in a syllogism must relate to the other two.25 
The syllogism strikes me as an ideal instruction tool in 
Secured Transactions, a course built on a foundation of statutory 
rules, most of which are codified in U.C.C. Article 9.  Article 9 
reveals how a debtor may create an enforceable security interest 
in its property.26  It provides rules that address perfection of a 
security interest.27  The statute devotes twenty-three provisions 
to priority matters,28 twenty-seven to filing concerns,29 and 
twenty-eight to default issues.30  Additionally, Article 9 includes 
a list of eighty (EIGHTY!) defined terms!31  Given Article 9’s 
attention to detail and exhaustive coverage, Secured 
Transactions seems like an ideal course in which to emphasize 
syllogistic analysis.  State the rule (major premise).  State the 
relevant facts (minor premise).  Draw a conclusion.32  How hard 
can this be?33 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 6. 
26 See generally U.C.C. § 9-203(a), (b) (2009).  Statutory citations are to the 
American Law Institute’s 2009–2010 edition of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9. 
27 See generally §§ 9-301 through 9-316. 
28 See §§ 9-317 through 9-342. 
29 See §§ 9-501 through 9-527. 
30 See §§ 9-601 through 9-628. 
31 See § 9-102(a)(1)–(80).  Article 9 also incorporates definitions found elsewhere in 
the U.C.C.  See § 9-102(b), (c). 
32 See James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism:  Legal 
Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 722 (2006) 
(suggesting that, in describing the syllogism, “the most important concept to grasp is that 
the major premise states the rule of law, the minor premise states the facts relevant to 
the major premise, and the conclusion flows logically from the premises”). 
33 The syllogism bears a striking resemblance to the traditional “IRAC” formula on 
which all law students are weaned, an observation shared by others.  See, e.g., Adam 
Todd, Neither Dead Nor Dangerous:  Postmodernism and the Teaching of Legal Writing, 
58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 938 (2006) (observing that “the deductive syllogism [is] commonly 
known by the acronym IRAC”);; Jill J. Ramsfield, Is “Logic” Culturally Based?  A 
Contrastive, International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 
186 n.117 (1997) (“IRAC is the acronym for Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion that is 
often taught to first-year students as an adaptation of the syllogism’s major premise, 
Do Not Delete 2/6/2010 2:16 PM 
102 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:97 
From my side of the lectern, the approach holds quite an 
attraction.  But Article 9 has been my traveling companion for 
over fifteen years, so maybe my perspective is not shared by the 
student who journeys at my side for only fifteen weeks.  My 
students and I can readily conclude that Socrates must be mortal 
if we know that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man.  But 
using that simple illustration as a template to master a complex 
and technical collection of statutory provisions may appear 
impossible to the typical student.  The task is not impossible, but 
it may be daunting.  Some of the challenges are created by 
Article 9 itself and are examined in Part II. 
II.  STATUTORY ROADBLOCKS TO THE EFFECTIVE  
USE OF THE SYLLOGISM 
Given its emphasis on statutory analysis, Secured 
Transactions is a course where deductive reasoning can be an 
effective, and oft-used, teaching tool.  But Article 9 itself creates 
roadblocks which may frustrate learning through syllogistic 
analysis.  This part of the article highlights seven areas of 
concern. 
A. “What we’ve got here is failure to communicate.”34 
The major premise of the syllogism—“All men are mortal”—
is the rule of law.  In Secured Transactions, the rule of law is 
most often drawn from Article 9 (e.g., “A secured party may 
perfect a security interest in the debtor’s equipment by filing a 
financing statement.”).  The minor premise of the syllogism—
“Socrates is a man”—is a factual statement.  In Secured 
Transactions, the factual statement is extracted from a case or a 
problem (e.g., “Alamo Bank filed a financing statement against 
BizCorp’s equipment in which Alamo Bank has an enforceable 
security interest.”).  The conclusion of the syllogism—“Therefore, 
 
minor premise, and conclusion.”);; Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and 
Greater Powers:  A Separability Approach,  43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 445 n.284 (1995) (“The 
well-known IRAC (Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion), would take the form of 
syllogisms. For example, after one identifies the issue, the next steps are to find the rule 
(major premise), do the application (minor premise), and reach a conclusion.”). 
34 Most film buffs will recognize this quotation from Cool Hand Luke (Warner Bros. 
1967).  The line is spoken by “the Captain” (Strother Martin) and addressed to Luke (Paul 
Newman), who is having difficulty conforming to rural prison life after being sentenced to 
a chain gang for destroying several parking meters.  The line is #11 on the American Film 
Institute’s list of “AFI’s 100 Years . . . 100 Movie Quotes.”  See http://connect.afi.com/ 
site/DocServer/quotes100.pdf?docID=242 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009). 
Initially, Telly Savalas was cast as the title character, but he was in Europe and 
refused to fly to the United States.  The producers did not wait for Savalas to return by 
boat and instead chose to cast Paul Newman.  See Telly Savalas News and Trivia, http:// 
www.celebritywonder.com/html/Tellysavalas_trivia1.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
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Socrates is mortal”—is a truth drawn from the major and minor 
premises.  In Secured Transactions, the student reviews the rule 
of law and the factual statement and reaches a conclusion (e.g., 
“Alamo Bank has perfected its security interest in BizCorp’s 
equipment.”). 
Observe, however, that a party may reach an incorrect 
conclusion if terms common to both premises have different 
meanings.  Perhaps the author of the major premise—the rule 
maker—defines “man” as “all males over 21 years of age.”  
Suppose the author of the minor premise—the fact finder—
defines “man” as “all males who have reached puberty.”  Because 
the authors of both premises are not singing from the same 
hymnal, the syllogism will yield an incorrect conclusion if 
Socrates has reached puberty but is not over 21 years of age.35  
And this problem can arise in a Secured Transactions course 
because Article 9 occasionally redefines ordinary terms in an 
unconventional and counter-intuitive manner, which may lead 
students to reach logical, but incorrect, conclusions. 
Consider, then, the following three examples which examine 
some basic Article 9 terminology. 
Example #1: Roger, a lawyer, is an avid collector of scarce baseball 
cards.  Last week he purchased the “Mona Lisa” of baseball cards—a 
rare Honus Wagner36 card released in 1909 by the American Tobacco 
Company—for $3.25 million.37  He keeps the card in a temperature-
 
35 Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 834: 
Even the syllogism about Socrates would be unimpressive if the speaker were a 
lexicographical dictator (O’Brien in 1984?) who could redefine ‘man’ and 
‘mortal’ at a stroke of the pen; or if Socrates were a boy, a god, a character in 
fiction, or a hermaphrodite; or if listeners had imperfect command of the 
speaker’s language. 
This point hit home for me during a recent discussion with a colleague.  We were talking 
about his clerkship and whether he enjoyed life in Charleston.  He made some comments 
that suggested to me that we had very different opinions of Charleston.  Of course we did.  
He was talking about Charleston, West Virginia, but I assumed we were talking about 
Charleston, South Carolina. 
36 Honus Wagner, a longtime shortstop for the Pittsburgh Pirates, “was a 
sensational hitter, a brilliant base-runner and a flawless fielder” and “is considered by 
many to be baseball’s greatest all-around player.”  See Honus Wagner Biography, 
http://www.honuswagner.com/biography.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).  He is one of five 
members of the inaugural class inducted into baseball’s hall of fame in 1936 (along with 
Ty Cobb, Walter Johnson, Christy Mathewson, and Babe Ruth).  See Dan Holmes, The 
First Five: A Look at the Original Members of the Baseball Hall of Fame, Feb. 18, 2007, 
http://www.baseballhalloffame.org/news/article.jsp?ymd=20070218&content_id=571&vke
y=hof_new. 
37 The reader who believes Roger overpaid should note that a Wagner “T206" card 
once owned by hockey legend Wayne Gretzky sold for $2.8 million in September 2007, 
only six months after selling for $2.35 million.  See NBCSports.com, 1909 Wagner card 
sells for record $2.8 million, Sept. 6, 2007, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/20629113/.  A 
recently published book recounts the history of this card, what the dust jacket describes 
as the “holy grail” of baseball card collecting.  See MICHAEL O’KEEFFE & TERI THOMPSON, 
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controlled safety deposit box at his bank. 
Under Article 9, the Honus Wagner card is: 
 A. equipment. 
 B. a consumer good. 
 C. investment property. 
Example #2: A retail store sells stand-alone software disks, music 
and book CDs, and movie DVDs.  Most customers buy these products 
for personal, family, or household use. 
Under Article 9, the items in the store are: 
 A. general intangibles. 
 B. inventory. 
 C. consumer goods. 
Example #3: Jennifer, a recent college graduate, received a $15,000 
business loan last week.  The bank required Jennifer’s parents to 
provide adequate collateral.38  Jennifer and both parents executed the 
promissory note, obligating themselves jointly and severally. 
Under Article 9: 
 A. both parents are debtors. 
 B. both parents and Jennifer are debtors. 
 C. Jennifer is the only debtor. 
Most students select an answer based on the following 
reasoning.  In Example #1, Roger is a natural person, rather 
than a dealer, so the baseball card is a consumer good (or 
perhaps investment property if Roger was motivated to purchase 
the card because its market value is likely to increase with time).  
Equipment?  How silly.  In Example #2, the retail store is in the 
business of selling the software, CDs, and DVDs, so the items are 
inventory (or perhaps consumer goods if a customer’s intended 
use is relevant).  They cannot be general intangibles because the 
disks have a tangible quality.  In Example #3, Jennifer is a 
debtor because she applied for and received the loan proceeds 
and executed the promissory note.  Her parents, too, are debtors 
because they executed the promissory note.  In each instance, the 
 
THE CARD:  COLLECTORS, CON MEN, AND THE TRUE STORY OF HISTORY’S MOST DESIRED 
BASEBALL CARD (2007). 
38 If Jennifer intended to use the loan proceeds for a personal, family, or household 
purpose (instead of a business purpose), then the bank’s insistence on collateral might 
constitute an “unfair act or practice” under the Federal Trade Commission Act.  See 16 
C.F.R. §§ 444.2(a)(4) (2009) (indicating that a lender commits an unfair act or practice if it 
takes or receives from a consumer a non-possessory, non-purchase money, security 
interest in household goods); 444.1(d) (defining a “consumer” as “a natural person who 
seeks or acquires goods, services, or money for personal, family, or household use”);; 
441.1(i) (defining “household goods”). 
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student uses reasoning to reach a conclusion that is logical—yet 
possibly wrong. 
In Example #1, the card is movable, so it is a “good”39 and 
cannot be “investment property”40 (even if Roger may have been 
partially motivated to purchase the card for its probable 
appreciation in value41).  The four mutually-exclusive categories 
of goods are consumer goods, inventory, farm products, and 
equipment.42  The baseball card might not be a “consumer good” 
because it is stored in a vault and not being “used” for a 
“personal, family, or household” manner.43  Roger, an attorney, is 
 
39 See § 9-102(a)(44) (defining “goods” as “all things that are movable when a 
security interest attaches” and expressly excluding, among other types of collateral, 
“investment property”). 
40 Id. (expressly excluding from the definition of “goods” several types of collateral, 
including “investment property”).  See also § 9-102(a)(49) (limiting “investment property” 
to securities [defined at § 8-102(a)(15)], security entitlements [§ 8-102(a)(17)], securities 
accounts [§ 8-501(a)], commodity contracts [§ 9-102(a)(15)], and commodity accounts 
[§ 9-102(a)(14)]). 
41 I use a casebook in which the authors pose a problem involving a Ming Dynasty 
horse statue kept by a consumer debtor in a temperature-controlled bank vault.  In 
classifying the statue, the authors write: “Is the statue ‘investment property?’  NO.  
Investment property is a term of art defined in § 9-102(a)(49).  It includes stocks, bonds, 
etc.  Investment property is not goods.  The statue is goods (moveable, tangible, etc.).  
Goods held for investment purposes are either equipment or inventory.”  RAYMOND T. 
NIMMER, ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS:  SECURED FINANCING—CASES, MATERIALS, 
PROBLEMS, 155, 159 (3rd ed. 2003) (Teacher’s Manual, Problem 3.11).  I believe that goods 
held for investment purposes also may be “consumer goods.”  But that point does not 
detract from the authors’ conclusion (with which I agree) that an acquisition motivated by 
investment sentiment does not convert a “good” into “investment property. 
42 See § 9-102 cmt. 4.a. (first paragraph). 
43 See § 9-102(a)(23) (defining “consumer goods”).  With respect to the Ming Dynasty 
horse statue, one of the authors “thinks the statue is equipment . . . the residual category 
of goods . . . because [the owner] was not using the statue for personal, household or 
family purposes.  Indeed, was he ‘using’ the statue at all?”  This author acknowledges, 
however, that a court “might conclude the statue is consumer goods.  Students do so every 
year.”  See NIMMER, supra note 41, at 159.  Professor Ken Kettering, however, believes 
that a purchase “for the sheer pleasure of ownership” is “personal use” and contends that 
an “argument that [the owner] isn’t ‘using’ it because it’s tucked away in a vault is just a 
bad pun.  He can’t enjoy it unless he hangs it on a wall, rubs it over his body?  Nonsense.”  
See Memorandum from Ken Kettering to Tim Zinnecker, dated August 20, 2008 (copy on 
file with author).  The fact that prominent commercial law scholars can disagree on the 
classification further illustrates my point. 
The distinction between a “consumer good” and “equipment” is important for 
several reasons.  First, if the security agreement or financing statement describes the 
collateral by type, choosing the incorrect label may dictate whether the secured party has 
a security interest or the security interest is perfected.  See §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A) (requiring 
the debtor to authenticate a security agreement “that provides a description of the 
collateral”);; 9-502(a)(3) (indicating that a financing statement is sufficient if it “indicates 
the collateral”);; 9-108(b)(3) (permitting collateral descriptions by “type of collateral 
defined” by Article 9).  Second, a purchase-money security interest in many consumer 
goods, but not equipment, may be perfected automatically upon attachment.  
See § 9-309(1).  Third, some of the default provisions in Part 6 of Article 9 apply only to 
consumer goods.  See, e.g., §§ 9-620(e) (imposing mandatory dispositions of consumer 
goods in some instances); 9-624(c) (prohibiting waiver of redemption rights in consumer 
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not holding the card for sale or lease in the ordinary course of his 
business (at least absent evidence that he sells his cards on a 
regular basis), and the card does not otherwise fit within the 
definition of “inventory.”44  And even if Wagner spent time on a 
“farm club” roster,45 neither the card (nor Wagner himself) would 
be a “farm product.”46  So it can be plausibly argued that the card 
may fall within the residual category: equipment.47 
In Example #2, the various software disks, music CDs, and 
movie DVDs are not “consumer goods” in the hands of the retail 
store.  The fact that most customers purchase the items for 
personal, family, or household use is irrelevant (until the 
customer is the debtor and becomes the party whose primary use 
dictates the proper label).  Nor are the items necessarily 
“inventory,” even though the retail store is in the business of 
selling these tangible products.  “Inventory” applies only to 
“goods,”48 but the definition of “goods” excludes “a computer 
program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in 
which the program is embedded.”49  The stand-alone software 
 
goods); 9-625(c) (permitting recovery of minimum statutory damages for secured party’s 
noncompliance if collateral is consumer goods). 
44 See § 9-102(a)(48) (defining “inventory”) and cmt. 4.a (“Implicit in the definition 
[of “inventory”] is the criterion that the sales or leases are or will be in the ordinary 
course of business.”). 
45 A “farm club” is a minor league baseball team.  The term is credited to baseball 
executive Branch Rickey, who jokingly observed that minor league teams in small rural 
towns were “growing players down on the farm like corn.”  See Minor League Baseball: 
Information From Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/minor-league-baseball 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2009).  Rickey, who earned a law degree from the University of 
Michigan, was instrumental in integrating major league baseball.  His accomplishments 
included signing African-American Jackie Robinson and later drafting the first Latin-
American superstar, Roberto Clemente (who reached the 3,000-hit milestone on the last 
day of the 1972 season and then tragically died on December 31, 1972, in a plane crash 
while on a humanitarian mission to Nicaragua).  See John Stiglich, Branch Rickey: 
Forgotten American Hero, THE MICHIGAN DAILY, May 7, 2006, available at 
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/john-stiglich-branch-rickey-forgotten-american-
hero; ‘Clemente’ Tells Story of a True Baseball Hero, http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=5369849 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
46 See § 9-102(a)(34) (defining “farm products” to include crops and livestock that are 
the subject of a “farming operation”). 
47 See § 9-102(a)(33) (defining “equipment” as “goods other than inventory, farm 
products, or consumer goods”). 
48 See § 9-102(a)(48) (“‘Inventory’ means goods . . .”). 
49 See § 9-102(a)(44) (penultimate sentence of definition).  See also 9A WILLIAM D.  
HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES [REV] § 9-102.10 at 9-135 (2000) 
(“[A] program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in which the program 
is embedded is not a good, such as a diskette.”);; Ralph J. Rohner, Leasing Consumer 
Goods:  The Spotlight Shifts to the Uniform Consumer Leases Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 647, 
693 (2003) (observing that “a computer program that the consumer downloads into a 
home computer is likely to be treated as ‘software’ and not goods, even though the 
software is embedded in a tangible plastic disk”) (footnote omitted). 
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disks fall within the exclusionary language,50 as might the music 
CDs and movie DVDs if the audio and video data are 
accompanied by a computer program.  But even if these audio 
and video disks consist solely of data and are not accompanied by 
a computer program, the value of the disks is not the tangible 
disks themselves but the data on the tangible disks.51  These 
disks, then, could be “general intangibles.”52 
Finally, in Example #3, Jennifer is not a debtor, even though 
she has joined her parents in executing the promissory note and 
incurring liability for repayment.  Jennifer’s parents are offering 
the collateral, so they are “debtors.”53  But Jennifer does not have 
any property interest in the collateral, so she is not a “debtor” 
even though she is the direct beneficiary of the loan proceeds and 
is contractually obligated to repay the loan.54 
 
50 The software disks probably are “software,” defined at § 9-102(a)(75) and, 
therefore, are expressly included within the definition of “general intangibles” at 
§ 9-102(a)(42). 
51 See In re Information Exch., Inc., 98 B.R. 603, 604–05 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) 
(concluding nonfiling creditor’s possession of computer tape did not perfect a security 
interest because the collateral—the information and programming on the tape, rather 
than the tape itself—was a “general intangible” and not a “good”);; Page v. Hotchkiss, 52 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 365, 368–71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (initially concluding under 
U.C.C. Article 2 that software developed by Hotchkiss for Page was a programming 
“service” rather than a “good,” and then observing under U.C.C. Article 9 “that what 
Hotchkiss provided was not goods since what was provided was a modified computer 
program embedded in a convenient medium for Page to access” and that “[t]he real object 
of Page’s purchase was the intellectual property which had been loaded and stored on a 
transferable medium”).  Cf. In re C Tek Software, Inc., 117 B.R. 762, 767–68 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1990) (relying on In re Bedford Computer Corp., 62 B.R. 555, 567 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
1986), to conclude that “the source code is more tangible than intangible because ‘the 
source code . . . cannot exist independent from the actual hardware components to which 
it gives operational life’”). 
52 Determining whether the CDs and the DVDs are “inventory” or “general 
intangibles” is important for several reasons under Article 9.  For example, using one—
but not both—terms in the collateral description in the security agreement or financing 
statement could leave the secured party at best with an unperfected security interest in 
the items and at worst no security interest in the items.  See §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A) (requiring 
the debtor to authenticate a security agreement “that provides a description of the 
collateral”);; 9-502(a)(3) (indicating that a financing statement is sufficient if it “indicates 
the collateral”);; 9-108(b)(3) (permitting collateral descriptions by “type of collateral 
defined” by the U.C.C.).  Also, a secured party can perfect a security interest in inventory, 
but not general intangibles, by taking possession.  See § 9-313(a) (listing “goods” but not 
“general intangibles”). 
53 See § 9-102(a)(28) (defining “debtor” as “(A) a person having an interest . . . in the 
collateral . . . .”). 
54 See § 9-102 cmt. 2.a. (exs. 2 and 3).  Because Jennifer has incurred a payment 
obligation on a secured debt, she is an “obligor” under § 9-102(a)(59)(i).  Correctly 
identifying the “debtor” is important for a variety of reasons.  For example, most security 
interests are memorialized in a written security agreement, which must be authenticated 
by the “debtor.”  See § 9-203(b)(3)(A).  Also, if the secured party disposes of the collateral 
following default, the “debtor” usually is entitled to receive an asset disposition notice 
under § 9-611(c)(1) and any surplus proceeds under § 9-615(d)(2). 
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The preceding discussion, then, illustrates one possible 
roadblock to the effective use of syllogisms in a Secured 
Transactions course.  Article 9 occasionally redefines ordinary 
terms in an unconventional and counter-intuitive manner, which 
may lead students to reach logical, but incorrect, conclusions. 
B. “[B]ecause thou hast not given him warning, he shall die in 
his sin.”55 
Socrates decides to attend law school (he’s curious to know 
more about this “Socratic method” that seems to be so popular 
with the students).  The application form states: “Your 
application is complete only if it includes an undergraduate 
transcript, two letters of reference, a recent LSAT score, and 
$50.”  So Socrates completes and personally delivers the 
application form, together with the other requested materials, to 
the admissions committee.  Several months come and go, and 
Socrates does not hear from the admissions committee.  He 
contacts the committee and receives a short letter, the body of 
which states: “The admissions committee has not yet reviewed 
your application because your file is missing a ‘personal essay.’  
We have filled all slots for the incoming class, but we encourage 
you to apply again next year.”  Alas (for Socrates), the application 
form failed to direct Socrates to a paragraph found elsewhere in 
the law school’s literature which gives the admissions committee 
the discretion to decline to review an application file that fails to 
include a “personal essay.”  According to the form, Socrates 
submitted a complete application.  He can logically conclude from 
the statement on the form, and his compliance with the form’s 
requests, that his application will not be ignored by the 
admissions committee because his file fails to provide additional 
information not mentioned on the application form.  But his 
logical conclusion has led to an unwelcome result. 
And Article 9 sets a similar trap for the unwary by 
occasionally failing to warn the reader that compliance with a 
straightforward rule may render a logical conclusion, but yield 
disastrous consequences. 
Consider the following hypothetical.  To secure repayment of 
a $25,000 loan, BizCorp grants to SmallBank an enforceable 
security interest in all of BizCorp’s current and future accounts, 
equipment, and inventory.  SmallBank will perfect its security 
interest by filing a financing statement with the appropriate 
 
55 Ezekiel 3:20 (King James).  It gets worse: “ . . . and his righteousnesse which he 
hath done shall not be remembered : but his blood will I require at thine hand.”  Id.  
Yikes! 
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filing office.56  Section 9-502 states that a financing statement “is 
sufficient only if it: (1) provides the name of the debtor; 
(2) provides the name of the secured party . . . ; and (3) indicates 
the collateral covered by the financing statement.”57  
SmallBank’s lawyer prepares the following form for filing: 
FINANCING STATEMENT 
 NAME OF DEBTOR:   BizCorp 
 NAME OF SECURED PARTY:  SmallBank 
COLLATERAL:  BizCorp’s current and future  
accounts, equipment, and 
inventory 
She submits the form, along with the correct fee and an 
instruction letter, to the appropriate filing officer.  The filing 
officer timely informs SmallBank’s lawyer that it has rejected the 
filing.58 
TRUE or FALSE: Because SmallBank’s filing provided all of 
the information required by § 9-502(a), the filing officer 
improperly rejected the filing. 
Most students will compare the information on the form 
(minor premise) against the information required by § 9-502 
(major premise) and conclude that the filing is “sufficient.”  These 
students then conclude that because the filing is “sufficient” (e.g., 
adequate, proper, correct, etc.),59 the filing officer improperly 
rejected the filing.  But this logical rationale leads to an incorrect 
conclusion.  In fact, the rejection was proper! 
Concerned that filing officers might exercise too much 
discretion when deciding whether to accept a financing 
statement, the drafters provided an exclusive list of grounds for 
rejection.60  Those grounds include the omission of specific pieces 
 
56 See § 9-310(a) and cmt. 2 (stating the general rule that a financing statement will 
perfect an enforceable security interest in most types of collateral). 
57 § 9-502(a). 
58 See § 9-520(b) (requiring the filing officer to “communicate to the person that 
presented the [financing statement] the fact of and reason for the refusal . . . in no event 
more than two business days after the filing office receives the [financing statement]”). 
59 Cf. §§ 9-520(c) (noting that a “filed” financing statement which satisfies § 9-502(a) 
is “effective”);; 9-520 cmt. 3 (referring to a financing statement which complies with 
§ 9-502 as “legally sufficient to perfect a security interest”). 
60 See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets the 
Bankruptcy Code:  Policy and Impact, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 100 n.83 (2001) 
(noting the inclusion of provisions for the purpose of “limiting the grounds upon which a 
filing office may reject a financing statement”);; Christopher S. Bose, A Trap for the 
Unwary:  Revised UCC Article 9’s Deceptive Technical Guillotine for Financing 
Statements, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 152, 152 (2001) (noting the drafters’ “competing 
consideration . . . to restrain instances where filing offices reject attempted filings on 
improper grounds”). 
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of information not required by § 9-502, including: (i) a mailing 
address for the secured party,61 (ii) the mailing address for the 
debtor,62 and (iii) an indication of whether the debtor is an 
individual or an organization63 (and, if the latter, the type of 
organization, the jurisdiction of organization, and an 
organizational identification number64).  In effect, then, Article 9 
bifurcates information into two classes: information necessary for 
an effective filing (§ 9-502(a)), and information necessary to avoid 
rejection by the filing office (§ 9-516(b)).65  Because the filing 
submitted by SmallBank’s lawyer failed to include these pieces of 
information, the filing officer had several legitimate grounds for 
rejecting the filing.66 
Section 9-502(a) specifically describes SmallBank’s filing as 
“sufficient” because it includes the information mandated by the 
subsection.  But surprisingly (at least to students who retain an 
amateur status), a “sufficient” filing can be rejected, an act which 
effectively leaves the secured party unperfected.  Certainly the 
reader deserves some warning that § 9-502(a) is potentially 
misleading and may trap the unwary.67  So where is this warning 
found?  The reader will find no cautionary language in subsection 
(a)68 or any of the other three statutory subsections of § 9-502.69  
 
61 See § 9-516(b)(4). 
62 See § 9-516(b)(5)(A). 
63 See § 9-516(b)(5)(B).  See also §§ 1-201(b)(25) (defining “organization”);; 9-102(c) 
(incorporating definitions in Article 1). 
64 See § 9-516(b)(5)(C)(i)–(iii). 
65 One author describes the “analysis of this bifurcation” of information as 
“increasingly complex.”  Lawrence R. Ahern, III, “Workouts” Under Revised Article 9:  A 
Review of Changes and Proposal for Study, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 115, 148 (2001).  
See also Richard H. Nowka, Minor Errors in ‘In-Lieu-Of’ Statements Under U.C.C. Section 
9-706:  Did the Drafters of Revised Article 9 Forget the Safety Net?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 721, 
729–30 (2004) (observing the “interesting drafting peculiarity” of §§ 9-502 and 9-516).  Cf. 
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 2001:  A Code Odyssey (New Dawn for 
the Article 9 Secured Creditor), 106 COM. L.J. 105, 144 (2001) (“If [the information stated 
in § 9-502(a)] is all that Revised Article 9 requires by way of valid financing statement, 
you might legitimately wonder why the initial financing statement form included in 
revised section 9-521 asks for considerably more information.”). 
66 The information required by § 9-516(b) “assists searchers in weeding out ‘false 
positives,’ i.e., records that a search reveals but which do not pertain to the debtor in 
question.”  § 9-520 cmt. 3. 
67 Bose, supra note 60, at 157 (“Section 9-502(a) may lead the less experienced 
Article 9 reader to believe that the requirements for a financing statement are simple, 
easy, and nontechnical, thereby trapping the unwary into a failure to achieve perfection of 
the security interest.”). 
68 Subsection (a) does direct the reader to subsection (b) if the filing covers 
as-extracted  collateral, timber to be cut, or goods which are or may become fixtures.  
§ 9-502(a)  (“Subject to subsection (b) . . . .”). 
69 The reader who reviews the accompanying “Official Comments” may stumble 
across this inconspicuous and rather innocuous statement:  “In addition, the filing office 
must reject a financing statement lacking certain other information formerly required as 
a condition of perfection (e.g., an address for the debtor or secured party).  See Sections 
9-516(b), 9-520(a).”  § 9-502 cmt. 4.  Most of us who have been anointed to teach Secured 
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Nor will the reader observe any red flags in either of the two 
neighboring statutes, §§ 9-501 and 9-503.70  Not until several 
sections (and pages) later are the grounds for rejecting a 
“sufficient” filing tucked away—in § 9-516(b).71 
The foregoing analysis reveals another potential difficulty in 
presenting material in a Secured Transactions course in a 
syllogistic format.  Article 9 occasionally fails to warn the reader 
that compliance with a straightforward rule may yield both a 
logical conclusion and disastrous consequences. 
C. “How clever you are, my dear!  You never mean a single word 
you say.”72 
Socrates is flying to Chicago to present a paper on the 
musings of noted philosopher L. P. Berra.73  He arrives at the 
airport and notices several signs that state: “Each passenger is 
limited to one carry-on article.  No exceptions.”  Socrates 
observes a passenger in the boarding line with a laptop 
 
Transactions, however, will attest that few of our students read the Official Comments on 
a consistent basis.  Cf. Dale Beck Furnish, The Creation and Notice of Security Interests in 
Movable Property, 36 U.C.C. L.J. 99, 107 n.17 (2003) (concluding that “[o]nly the 
rigorously compulsive and insightful reader of the statute is likely to make the 
connection” between §§ 9-502(a) and 9-516(b) because the “only clue” is “hidden” in 
§ 9-502 cmt. 4). 
70 These two sections address filing location and sufficiency of party names, 
respectively. 
71 Section § 9-520(a) states that a filing officer “shall refuse to accept” a financing 
statement for any reason stated in § 9-516(b), which might prompt the reader to conclude 
that a rejectable financing statement cannot be effective.  That conclusion, although 
logical, is incorrect.  See § 9-520(c) (indicating that the filing is effective, “even if the filing 
office is required to refuse to accept it for filing under subsection (a),” but affording 
protection under § 9-338 to specific parties who may have relied on incorrect information 
in the filing).  See also Robert M. Lloyd, The New Article 9:  Its Impact on Tennessee Law 
(Part I), 67 TENN. L. REV. 125, 173 (1999) (referring to the “convolution” that exists 
between §§ 9-520(a) and 9-516(b)). 
72 Penned by playwright Oscar Wilde and spoken by Lady Hunstanton to Mrs. 
Allonby in A Woman of No Importance (act 2).  See OSCAR WILDE, A WOMAN OF NO 
IMPORTANCE, in 6 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF OSCAR WILDE 65 (The Aldine Publishing Co., 
1910).  Readers may not know that Wilde was christened with three middle names 
(Fingal O’Flahertie Wills), and, despite his magic as a wordsmith, authored only one 
novel:  THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY.  See H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, OSCAR WILDE: A 
BIOGRAPHY 5, 148 (1975). 
73 Known as “Yogi” to his friends.  His most profound thoughts include the following:  
“This is like deja vu all over again.”  “You can observe a lot just by watching.”  “Nobody 
goes there anymore;; it’s too crowded.”  “If you come to a fork in the road, take it.”  “Texas 
has a lot of electrical votes.”  “You should always go to other people's funerals;; otherwise, 
they won't come to yours.”  See Things People Said: Yogi Berra Quotes, http://www.rink 
works.com/said/yogiberra.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).  Yogi Berra also was one of 
baseball’s greatest catchers.  During his 19-year career with the New York Yankees, he 
won the American League M.V.P. award three times and played on 14 pennant-winning 
teams and 10 World Series championships.  He was elected to the Hall of Fame in 1972.  
See National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum, Yogi Berra, http://www.baseballhall 
offame.org/hofers/detail.jsp?playerId=110925 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
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computer, a briefcase, and a small garment bag.  Socrates, who 
has never flown before this trip, logically concludes, from the 
signs, that this passenger will be asked to check two of the 
items.74  But the passenger is permitted to board the airplane 
with all three items!  Socrates discovers that he is sitting next to 
this passenger.  Socrates expresses amazement that the 
passenger could carry the laptop computer, the briefcase, and the 
small garment bag onto the plane.  “Doesn’t the sign tell all 
passengers to limit themselves to one carry-on article?” Socrates 
asks.  “Yes,” says the passenger, “but you can’t read the sign 
literally.” 
And a student who reads Article 9 literally may confront the 
same predicament of reaching logical, but incorrect, 
conclusions.75 
 
74 He also might logically conclude that the passenger carrying a six-inch 
screwdriver and long knitting needles will have those items confiscated.  Maybe not!  See 
TSA: Prohbited Items, http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/prohibited/permitted-
prohibited-items.shtm#4 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009); TSA: Transporting Knitting Needles 
& Needlepoint, http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/assistant/editorial_1252.shtm (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2009).  Snow globes (how deadly!), of course, are a no-no.  See TSA: 
Prohibited Items, http://www.tsa.gov/ travelers/airtravel/prohibited/permitted-prohibited-
items.shtm#11 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
75 Judge Learned Hand once wrote:  “There is no surer way to misread any 
document than to read it literally . . . .”  Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2nd Cir. 
1944) (Hand, J., concurring).  Perhaps rigid adherence to the text should be discouraged if 
a literal reading will render an absurd result or the reader is confronting a matter 
unforeseen by the author.  But I do not raise either of those situations. 
One of Judge Hand’s best-known law clerks was constitutional scholar Gerald 
Gunther, who took more than twenty years to research and write what one reviewer for 
The New York Times called “the fullest, most sensitive, most penetrating of judicial 
biographies.”  See Ari L. Goldman, Gerald Gunther, Legal Scholar, Dies at 75, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/01/us/gerald-gunther-legal-
scholar-dies-at-75.html. 
  In the biography of his mentor, Professor Gunther recounts this amusing story 
from his clerkship, concerning Judge Hand’s request for Gunther’s critique of a draft of a 
dissenting opinion in United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (1953): 
After seven weeks, he handed his most recent effort to me.  “Now look at this 
one; see if this one holds water any better.”  I studied the new draft for several 
hours and returned to his desk.  Hand looked up eagerly:  “Well, will it wash?”  
I responded that portions of the opinion now seemed reasonably airtight, but 
there were still weaknesses in other sections.  Hand looked at me darkly, pain 
and annoyance clouding his face.  He heaved a deep sigh, then picked up a 
small paperweight on his desk and threw it in my general direction, missing 
me by only a narrow margin.  “Damn,” he shouted, “I can’t go on forever like 
this!  Thirteen drafts and it’s still not satisfactory?  Son, I get paid to decide 
cases.  At some point, I have to get off the fence and turn out an opinion.  
Enough!”  I had never heard Hand speak in such anger.  I turned pale and 
retreated, shaken, to my desk in the adjacent office.  I flung my head down on 
the desk and tried to regain my composure.  After a minute or so, I felt a hand 
gently tapping the back of my head.  Judge Hand, in his stocking feet, had 
silently left his desk, come into my office and hoisted himself to a sitting 
position on my desk.  I raised my face and looked up into his bemused 
countenance.  “Now, now,” he gently consoled, “you can’t take it that way!  It’s 
all part of the job!  Don’t take it so hard—you did your job;; I have to do mine.”  
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A party that wins a lawsuit against a debtor may become a 
“lien creditor,” defined as “a creditor that has acquired a lien on 
the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like.”76  For 
example, Jane might acquire a lien on Sarah’s jewelry after Jane 
wins her defamation lawsuit against Sarah, or SmithCorp might 
obtain a lien on the inventory of JonesCo following SmithCorp’s 
successful litigation against JonesCo for breach of contract.77 
As a general rule, a priority dispute between a lien creditor 
and the Article 9 secured party turns on whether the secured 
party holds a perfected security interest in the debtor’s property 
when the competing creditor first becomes a “lien creditor” (i.e., 
when its lien initially encumbers the debtor’s property).78  So, 
Lender will enjoy priority in Sarah’s jewelry if Lender holds a 
perfected security interest in the jewelry when Jane acquires her 
lien, but SmithCorp will enjoy priority if its lien on the JonesCo 
inventory arises before Lender obtains a perfected security 
interest in the inventory. 
 
That evening, my wife came to pick me up at the office so that we could go 
together to a social engagement.  She told me that she had encountered Hand 
on her way in and that he had chided her, “Come on, now, you’ve been married 
three or four years.  Don’t you ever yell at him?  You must yell at him once in a 
while.  He’s not used to it.  He’s got to get used to people yelling at him!” 
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND:  THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 620–21 (1994). 
76 § 9-102(a)(52)(A).  The term also includes certain assignees and receivers, and the 
dreaded trustee in bankruptcy (also known as “the prince of darkness”).  Id. at (B)–(D). 
77 The procedures necessary for the lien to attach to the debtor’s personal property 
vary among the states:  
but ordinarily a creditor first must obtain a judgment against the debtor and 
then secure a writ of execution ordering the sheriff to levy on the debtor’s 
property.  Some states, of course, allow the creditor to obtain a lien on personal 
property without first obtaining a judgment as in a prejudgment attachment[.] 
HAWKLAND, supra note 49, § 9-317:2 at 9-271 (footnote omitted).  See also Thomas M. 
Ward, Ordering the Judicial Process Lien and the Security Interest under Article Nine:  
Meshing Two Different Worlds (Part I—Secured Parties and Post-Judgment Process 
Creditors), 31 ME. L. REV. 223, 234–64 (1980) (discussing creation, characteristics, and 
timing of “liens” and resulting “lien creditor” status under different state laws). 
78 See § 9-317(a)(2)(A).  The statute states that the Article 9 security interest is 
subordinate, or junior, to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor “before” the 
security interest is perfected.  The statute’s use of “before” effectively gives the Article 9 
security interest priority in the case of a tie, which may arise when the lien attaches 
simultaneously with the moment of perfection.  This may occur when the secured party 
has taken all steps necessary to perfect its security interest in the debtor’s current and 
future assets, but the debtor has not yet acquired the particular asset subject to the lien. 
The statute also awards priority to the secured party who, when the lien attaches, 
has a security agreement in place that covers the asset and has already filed a financing 
statement.  See § 9-317(a)(2)(B).  Unlike the rule in (A), the rule in (B) protects the 
secured party who lacks perfection only because it has yet to give value.  See 
§§ 9-203(b)(1) (requiring value as a condition to enforceability); 9-203(a) (indicating that 
an enforceable security interest “attaches to collateral”);; 9-308(a) (requiring attachment 
as a prerequisite to perfection). 
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Unless its collateral is a consumer good, a purchase-money 
creditor (e.g., the dealer who sells on credit, or the third-party 
financer whose funds are used by the debtor to purchase the item 
from the dealer) must file a financing statement to perfect its 
purchase-money security interest.79  Whether the purchase-
money creditor is the dealer or the third-party financer, the 
creditor most often will not file its financing statement until 
sometime after the actual sale occurs and the buyer/debtor takes 
possession of the asset.  Under the general priority rule, then, the 
purchase-money creditor takes the risk that someone may 
become a “lien creditor” against the asset before the financing 
statement is filed.  In an effort to accommodate this risk and 
acknowledge this typical business practice (“sell first, file later”), 
the general priority rule is expressly subject to the following 
purchase-money carve out: 
[I]f a person files a financing statement with respect to a purchase-
money security interest before or within 20 days after the debtor 
receives delivery of the collateral, the security interest takes priority 
over the rights of a . . . lien creditor which arise between the time the 
security interest attaches and the time of filing.80 
This rule protects the purchase-money creditor from losing 
priority to a party who becomes a lien creditor against the asset 
after the security interest attaches to the asset and before the 
security interest is perfected, if the secured party perfects its 
security interest by filing a financing statement against the asset 
no later than the twentieth day after the debtor receives delivery 
of the asset.  On a timeline, then, the important events occur in 
this order: (1) the purchase-money security interest attaches; (2) 
a party becomes a “lien creditor” against the asset; and (3) the 
purchase-money creditor files its financing statement.  The only 
other important event is the date on which the buyer/debtor 
takes delivery of the asset. 
 
79 The technical requirements of a purchase-money security interest are found in 
§ 9-103.  Section 9-309(1) states the general rule that a purchase-money security interest 
in most consumer goods is perfected at attachment (often referred to as “automatic” 
perfection).  The negative implication is that a purchase-money security interest in 
collateral other than consumer goods—such as inventory and equipment—is not 
automatically perfected at attachment.  Instead, perfection of the security interest 
requires some additional step, usually the filing of a financing statement. 
80 § 9-317(e).  See also § 9-317(a)(2) (“except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(e) . . . .”);; Grant Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1387 
(1963) (referring to “the business practice of filing after delivery in cases of purchase 
money security interests in collateral other than inventory” as justification for the grace 
period, and then observing that “if the debtor insists that he must have the goods today, 
the purchase money financer can deliver them, without sacrificing his . . . priority, 
provided he perfects” within the prescribed grace period). 
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All of this seems rather straightforward.  So consider the 
following hypothetical.  ABC Florist Company buys, and takes 
possession of, a new delivery van on May 1.  Dealer retains a 
purchase-money security interest in the van that attaches on 
that date.  Smith, a successful litigant against ABC in a recent 
lawsuit, becomes a “lien creditor” against the van on May 3.  
Mindful of applicable state laws governing encumbrances on non-
inventory motor vehicles, Dealer does not file a financing 
statement against the van.  Instead, Dealer complies with 
applicable motor vehicle laws and submits paperwork to the 
applicable government office, which then issues a certificate of 
title marked to show Dealer’s security interest.  Dealer’s date of 
perfection is May 18.  A few weeks later, Smith and Dealer 
squabble over the van.  Which creditor has priority in the vehicle? 
Under the general priority rule of § 9-317(a), Smith enjoys 
priority because she became a “lien creditor” on May 3, several 
days before Dealer became perfected on May 18.  A student may 
address the relevance of the purchase-money exception with the 
following syllogism: 
A purchase-money creditor must timely file a financing statement to 
enjoy priority over a lien creditor whose interest arose between 
attachment and filing. 
Dealer, a purchase-money creditor (stipulated), did not file a financing 
statement. 
Dealer does not enjoy priority over a lien creditor whose interest arose 
between attachment and filing.81 
The syllogism states the rule, analyzes whether facts are 
present which satisfy the requirements of the rule, and draws a 
logical conclusion from that analysis.  So why is the conclusion 
wrong?  Because the rule cannot be read literally! 
The rule protects a purchase-money creditor who timely 
“files a financing statement.”82  Read literally, then, a person who 
timely complies with certificate-of-title laws cannot invoke the 
rule.  But the drafters of Article 9 did not intend for the rule to be 
read literally.  Instead, the rule is to be read as if it referred to a 
person who timely “files a financing statement or complies with 
the requirements of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in 
Section 9-311(a).”  An example of a statute mentioned in 
§ 9-311(a) is a “certificate-of-title statute . . . which provides for a 
 
81 Smith is such a lien creditor, a point hopefully addressed in one or more separate 
syllogisms. 
82 § 9-317(e). 
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security interest to be indicated on the certificate as a condition 
or result of perfection.”83 
How is the student supposed to know that the meaning of 
“files a financing statement” is something other than its plain 
meaning?  One might assume that the statutory language of 
§ 9-317(e) should be the first place to look for some clue.  But no 
clue exists in subsection (e), or in any of the other subsections of 
§ 9-317.  The critical statutory language is found several sections 
(and pages) earlier.  Section 9-311(b) states in relevant part: 
“Compliance with the requirements of a [certificate-of-title] 
statute . . . described in subsection (a) for obtaining priority over 
the rights of a lien creditor is equivalent to the filing of a 
financing statement under this article.”84  But § 9-311 is never 
cross-referenced in the body of § 9-317!  Perhaps the student will 
stumble across the reference to § 9-311 in the concluding 
paragraph of the eighth (and final) Official Comment to § 9-317.85  
But why should the reader not find such an important cross-
reference in the statutory language itself?86 
Article 9 strives to use straightforward, unambiguous, 
statutory language.  But as noted in the preceding analysis, 
sometimes that language fails to tell the reader the full story.  
Such incomplete language, when read literally, can lead to 
incorrect conclusions.  This inability to apply the statutory 
language at face value is yet another reason why mastering the 
legal principles in a Secured Transactions course through 
syllogisms can be challenging. 
 
83 § 9-311(a)(2). 
84 § 9-311(b).  See also §§ 9-311(a)(2) (requesting states to “list any certificate-of-title 
statute covering automobiles, trailers, mobile homes, boats, farm tractors, or the like, 
which provides for a security interest to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or 
result of perfection”);; 9-102(a)(10) (defining “certificate of title”). 
85 Official Comment 8 to § 9-317 is captioned “Purchase-Money Security Interests.”  
The first paragraph discusses subsection (e).  The second paragraph states: 
Section 9-311(b) provides that compliance with the perfection requirements of 
a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) “is equivalent to the filing of a 
financing statement.”  It follows that a person who perfects a security interest 
in goods covered by a certificate of title by complying with the perfection 
requirements of an applicable certificate-of-title statute “files a financing 
statement” within the meaning of subsection (e). 
§ 9-317 cmt. 8. 
86 The same issue arises in § 9-315, which addresses continued perfection in 
proceeds.  See § 9-315(d)(1)(A) (referring to “a filed financing statement”) and cmt. 6 
(indicating that compliance with perfection requirements under a statute or treaty 
described in § 9-311 falls within the intended meaning of the phrase “filed financing 
statement”). 
Article 9 offers evidence that the drafters knew how to cross-reference § 9-311 when 
discussing filed financing statements.  See, e.g., §§ 9-611(c)(3)(B), (C); 9-621(a)(2), (3). 
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D.  “Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of 
the text[.]”87 
In July, Socrates and Francois-Marie Arouet88 were in a car 
accident.  Arouet suffered a temporary injury to his back, which 
greatly affected his mobility.  Arouet completed all necessary 
paperwork and obtained a six-month permit to park in spaces 
reserved for persons with physical disabilities.  By October, 
Arouet’s mobility had returned to normal.  Socrates, relying on 
the policy underlying the issuance of the six-month permit, 
believes that Arouet’s parking permit is no longer effective.  He is 
surprised to discover, under the applicable law, that the parking 
permit remains effective for the full six months from issuance. 
Relying on a statute’s underlying policy to determine its 
proper application may be a logical approach.  But where there 
exists a disconnect between the policy and the text, such 
statutory construction may lead to incorrect conclusions.  And 
that can happen in a Secured Transactions course. 
Students learn early in the semester two basic priority rules: 
(1) a secured claim beats an unsecured claim; and (2) a perfected 
secured claim trumps an unperfected secured claim.89  After 
mastering the rules for creating an enforceable security 
interest,90 students turn their attention to the methods of 
perfection.  The most popular method of perfecting a security 
interest is filing a financing statement with the appropriate state 
official,91 the purpose of which “is to give notice to creditors and 
other interested parties that a security interest exists in property 
of the debtor.”92 
 
87 Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 188 (1994). 
88 Most readers know Arouet by his pen name, “Voltaire.”  He once remarked, 
“Behind every successful man stands a surprised mother-in-law.”  See Voltaire Quotes, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/v/voltaire.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).  
He also owned sixty walking sticks, twenty more than another contemporary French 
philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau.  See Canes, So Much More Than Walking Sticks, 
http://www.liveauctiontalk.com/free_article_detail.php?article_id=583 (last visited Oct. 
24, 2009).  Apparently their shared appreciation for the cane was the only matter on 
which they agreed.  See Rit Nosotro, Voltaire and Rousseau, http://www.hyperhistory.net/ 
apwh/essays/comp/cw20VoltairRousseau32200123.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (noting 
“their hatred for one another was well-known during their lifetime”). 
89 Article 9 codifies these two rules in §§ 9-201(a) and 9-322(a)(2), respectively. 
90 See generally § 9-203(a), (b). 
91 See § 9-310(a) (stating the general rule that “a financing statement must be filed 
to perfect all security interests”) and cmt. 2 (noting “a central Article 9 principle” that 
“[f]iling a financing statement is necessary for perfection of security interests”). 
92 Peoples Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting In re Glasco, Inc., 642 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1981)).  See also In re Perry Hollow 
Mgmt. Co., Inc., 297 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2002) (referring to “the intended purpose of the 
filing requirement, which is to give proper notice that a secured interest exists”);; Allstate 
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 109 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of filing 
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With this background in mind, assume that BankOne 
perfected a security interest in SmithCorp’s current and after-
acquired equipment, inventory, and accounts by filing a financing 
statement in July 2006 with the appropriate Texas official.  In 
February 2007, SmithCorp sold a valuable piece of its equipment 
to JonesCorp without BankOne’s knowledge or consent.  In July 
2007, SmithCorp changed its legal name to “HarrisCorp.” 
BankTwo made a secured loan to JonesCorp in November 
2008 and obtained and perfected a security interest in 
JonesCorp’s current and after-acquired equipment, inventory, 
and accounts by filing a financing statement that month with the 
appropriate Texas official.  Before funding the loan, BankTwo 
searched the U.C.C. records and found no financing statements 
filed against JonesCorp. 
BankThree made a secured loan to HarrisCorp in November 
2008 and obtained and perfected a security interest in 
HarrisCorp’s current and after-acquired equipment, inventory, 
and accounts by filing a financing statement that month with the 
appropriate Texas official.  Before funding the loan, BankThree 
searched the U.C.C. records and found no financing statements 
filed against HarrisCorp. 
In January 2009, two priority disputes erupt: BankOne and 
BankTwo are fighting over the piece of equipment sold by 
SmithCorp to JonesCorp in February 2007, and BankOne and 
BankThree are contesting the priority in a piece of equipment 
purchased by HarrisCorp in October 2007. 
A student who is asked to resolve these two priority disputes 
might rule against BankOne in both cases.  BankOne’s security 
interest in the two pieces of equipment was perfected by a filed 
financing statement.  BankTwo’s search against “JonesCorp” 
failed to reveal BankOne’s filing.  BankThree’s search against 
“HarrisCorp” yielded the same result.  BankOne’s filing failed to 
achieve its stated purpose, giving notice of its security interest.  
Because BankOne’s filing failed to accomplish its notice function, 
its filing should be deemed ineffective.  Absent an effective filing, 
BankOne’s security interest is unperfected and is subordinate to 
the perfected claims held by BankTwo and BankThree. 
 
financing statements is to put creditors on notice of existing interests in the debtor’s 
property.”);; Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 
1988) (observing that the financing statement “serves the purpose of putting subsequent 
creditors on notice that the debtor’s property is encumbered” (quoting Thorp Commercial 
Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., 654 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1981))); § 9-502 cmt. 2 
(referring to the system of “notice filing”). 
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Reformatted as a syllogism, the analysis might look like this: 
First syllogism (addressing BankOne’s continued perfection): 
A financing statement that fails to accomplish its “notice” function is 
ineffective to perfect a security interest. 
Searches performed by BankTwo and BankThree reveal that 
BankOne’s financing statement failed to give “notice” of its security 
interest in equipment either sold by SmithCorp to JonesCorp or 
purchased by HarrisCorp following the name change from SmithCorp. 
BankOne’s financing statement, which failed to accomplish its “notice” 
function, is ineffective to perfect its security interest in the two pieces 
of equipment. 
Second syllogism (addressing priority): 
A perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected security 
interest.93 
The secured claims held by BankTwo and BankThree in the 
equipment are perfected by effective filings; the secured claim held by 
BankOne in the equipment is no longer perfected because the 
financing statement has become ineffective. 
Perfected security interests held by BankTwo and BankThree enjoy 
priority over the unperfected security interest held by BankOne. 
Whether in narrative form or syllogisms, the analysis—
buttressed by policy—and conclusions drawn therefrom are 
logical.  Nevertheless, BankOne enjoys priority over both 
BankTwo and BankThree.  Its financing statement continues to 
perfect the security interest in the equipment sold by SmithCorp 
to JonesCorp, under a rule that states: “A filed financing 
statement remains effective with respect to collateral that is 
sold . . . and in which a security interest . . . continues.”94  Its 
financing statement also continues to perfect the security 
interest in the equipment purchased by HarrisCorp shortly after 
the name change from “SmithCorp,” under the rule that states: 
“the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest 
in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four months 
after, the [name] change” but “is not effective to perfect a security 
interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four 
 
93 For statutory authority, see § 9-322(a)(2). 
94 § 9-507(a).  Observe that the financing statement remains effective post-
disposition only if the underlying security interest survives the disposition, a matter 
addressed in § 9-315(a).  BankOne’s security interest in the equipment sold by SmithCorp 
to JonesCorp remains after the sale because BankOne did not authorize the disposition 
free of its security interest.  See § 9-315 cmt. 2 (second paragraph).  The moral of the story 
for BankTwo is that it “must inquire as to [JonesCorp’s] source of title and, if 
circumstances seem to require it, search in the name of a former owner [e.g., 
“SmithCorp”].”  § 9-507 cmt. 3. 
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months after the [name] change.”95  Because BankOne filed its 
financing statement in 2006, long before BankTwo and 
BankThree filed their financing statements in 2008, BankOne 
continues to enjoy priority in the disputed collateral,96 
notwithstanding the fact that its continued perfection rests on a 
financing statement that failed to accomplish its notice function. 
This discussion illustrates another possible hurdle to the 
effective use of syllogisms in Secured Transactions.  Article 9 
occasionally adopts rules that are inconsistent with policy-based 
analysis, which may lead to incorrect major premises and, 
accordingly, erroneous conclusions. 
E. “Consistency, madam, is the first of Christian duties.”97 
Socrates and John Ford98 have been discussing films which 
received the most Academy Award nominations in particular 
years.  Ford mentions that Gone With The Wind, All About Eve, 
Ben-Hur, Schindler’s List, and Titanic received the most 
nominations in their respective years.99  Each film also was 
 
95 § 9-507(c).  This name-change rule requires BankThree to consider the past and 
the future.  BankThree must determine prior names used by HarrisCorp and search for 
financing statements filed under those prior names (such as “SmithCorp”).  BankThree 
must also monitor HarrisCorp for any future name changes and, if necessary, timely file a 
name-change amendment within four months of the change.  See § 9-507(c)(2) and cmt. 4. 
96 See § 9-322(a)(1) (stating the general rule that a secured party who files or 
perfects first enjoys priority). 
97 Penned by Charlotte Bronte, and spoken by Mr. Brocklehurst to Mrs. Reed in 
Chapter 4 of JANE EYRE.  See CHARLOTTE BRONTE, JANE EYRE 28 (Bantam Classic 1981) 
(1847).  Perhaps Bronte’s most beloved work, JANE EYRE was originally published in 1847 
under the pseudonym “Currer Bell.”  See Charlotte Bronte, http://academic.brooklyn.cuny 
.edu/english/melani/cs6/bronte.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).  One of the more famous 
film adaptations premiered in 1944 and features Joan Fontaine in the title role and Orson 
Welles as Edward Rochester.  A very young Elizabeth Taylor appears in an uncredited 
role, and the screenplay is written, in part, by Orson Welles’ co-founder of The Mercury 
Theatre:  John Houseman (who, as noted earlier in footnote 5, portrayed Professor 
Charles Kingsfield many years later).  See Jane Eyre 1944, http://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0036969/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009); Art Pierce, Orson Welles, The Mercury Theatre, 
and The Campbell Playhouse, http://www.mercurytheatre.info/history (last visited Oct. 
24, 2009). 
98 John Ford won the Oscar for Best Director four times, a record.  The films for 
which he won the award are The Informer, The Grapes of Wrath, How Green Was My 
Valley, and The Quiet Man.  He also received a nomination for Stagecoach.  Although no 
one has received as many wins, other famous directors have garnered more nominations, 
including Woody Allen (six), Frank Capra (six), Martin Scorsese (six), Steven Spielberg 
(six), Fred Zinnemann (seven), David Lean (seven), Billy Wilder (eight), and William 
Wyler (twelve).  See Best Director Facts & Trivia, http://www.filmsite.org/bestdirs.html 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
99 See All About Oscar: Academy Award Trivia and Statistics, http://www.reel 
classics.com/Articles/General/oscar-trivia-article.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (All 
About Eve and Titanic tied with fourteen nominations in their respective years while 
Gone With the Wind was a close runner-up with thirteen.); Ben-Hur 1959, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0052618/awards (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (accumulating 
twelve nominations); 1993 Academy Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite 
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named “Best Picture.”100  Ford also informs Socrates that A 
Streetcar Named Desire, Mary Poppins, Who’s Afraid of Virginia 
Woolf?, Reds, and Tootsie received the most nominations in their 
respective years.101  These films were nominated for, but did not 
win, the “Best Picture” award.102  Ford then tells Socrates that 
Dreamgirls led all films released in 2006 with eight 
nominations.103  Based on the preceding information, Socrates 
logically concludes that Dreamgirls was a “Best Picture” 
nominee, if not a winner.  Socrates is wrong.104  Dreamgirls is the 
only film to receive the most Academy Awards nominations in its 
year of eligibility and not receive a “Best Picture” nomination.105  
So much for precedent! 
Article 9 has been known to address a specific concern with a 
series of rules that render a consistent and predictable result—
except, for some unexplained reason, in one instance.  As 
happened to Socrates in the preceding paragraph, this 
unanticipated departure from what all other related rules 
suggest is the norm may lead students to logically reach an 
incorrect conclusion.106 
 
.org/aa93.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (Schindler’s List tied Ben-Hur with twelve 
nominations). 
100 See Academy Awards, USA, http://www.imdb.com/Sections/Awards/Academy_ 
Awards_USA/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
101 See 1951 Academy Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite.org/ 
aa51.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (A Streetcar Named Desire earned twelve 
nominations); 1964 Academy Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite.org/ 
aa64.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (Mary Poppins earned thirteen nominations); 1966 
Academy Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite.org/aa66.html (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2009) (Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? also earned thirteen nominations); 1981 
Academy Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite.org/aa81.html (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2009) (Reds accumulated twelve nominations); 1982 Academy Awards Winners 
and History, http://www.filmsite.org/ aa82.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (Tootsie had 
ten nominations). 
102 The respective “Best Picture” films were:  An American in Paris (1951 Academy 
Awards Winners and History, supra note 101); My Fair Lady (1964 Academy Awards 
Winners and History, supra note 101); A Man For All Seasons (1966 Academy Awards 
Winners and History, supra note 101); Chariots Of Fire (1981 Academy Awards Winners 
and History, supra note 101); and Gandhi (1982 Academy Awards Winners and History, 
supra note 101). 
103 See 2006 Academy Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite.org/ 
aa06.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
104 The five “Best Picture” nominees in 2006 were The Departed (winner), Babel, 
Letters From Iwo Jima, Little Miss Sunshine, and The Queen.  See 2006 Academy Awards 
Winners and History, supra note 103. 
105 See No Best Picture Nomination for ‘Dreamgirls,’ http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/16767796/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
106 Asking a student to craft a rule by observing other rules may suggest that I am 
moving from deductive reasoning to inductive reasoning.  Judge Aldisert describes 
inductive reasoning as:  
a form of logic in which big, general principles are divined from observing the 
outcomes of many small events.  In this form of inductive logic, you reason 
from multiple particulars to the general . . . .  Thus, inductive reasoning is a 
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As a general rule, a filed financing statement is effective for 
five years.107  Students may be asked to analyze whether certain 
post-filing events might shorten the five-year duration of 
effectiveness.  Those events may include the following: 
* the debtor changes its name from “SmithCorp” to “JonesCorp”; 
* the debtor relocates its entire business from Houston to Dallas (the 
same state of the original filing) or Chicago (a different state from 
the original filing); 
* the debtor converts several units of “inventory” (collateral) to in-
house use as “equipment” (not collateral); and 
* without the secured party’s consent, the debtor disposes of some 
collateral by selling its chattel paper to FinCo (incorporated under 
the laws of the same state of the original filing) and its accounts to 
PrimeCo (incorporated under the laws of a different state). 
The name change has no immediate impact on the continued 
effectiveness of the original filing.  Under the applicable rule, the 
filing remains effective through the end of the five-year period to 
perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor 
either before the name change or within four months after the 
name change.108  The filing, however, will not remain effective to 
perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor 
more than four months after the name change unless the secured 
party files a name-change amendment within that four-month 
period.109 
The debtor’s in-state change of address has no immediate or 
future impact on the continued effectiveness of the original 
filing,110 presumably because a search against the debtor’s name 
after the address change will continue to reveal the original 
filing.111  Whether an out-of-state address change may impact the 
effectiveness of an original filing is dictated by the type of debtor.  
 
logic of probabilities and generalities, not certainties.  It yields workable rules, 
but not proven truths.   
Aldisert, supra note 3, at 12–13.  Because my concern is with an existing statutory 
provision, rather than with the creation of a gap-filling rule that may be subject to 
some discretionary application, I do not believe that I have moved completely into 
the realm of inductive reasoning.  That certainly is not my intent. 
107 See § 9-515(a). 
108 § 9-507(c)(1). 
109 § 9-507(c)(2).  A name-change amendment filed more than four months after the 
name change is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor 
more than four months after the name change, but the effectiveness does not commence 
until the filing date of the amendment.  Id. at cmt. 4.  This gap in perfection exposes the 
secured party to a risk of nonpriority against former subordinate creditors who have 
climbed up the priority ladder. 
110 § 9-507(b). 
111 Financing statements are indexed “according to the name of the debtor.”  
§ 9-519(c)(1). 
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If the debtor is a corporation, limited partnership, or other 
“registered organization,”112 then a mere address change has no 
effect.  The correct place to file a financing statement against a 
registered organization is with the chartering state, whether or 
not the entity has a physical presence in that state,113 so the 
original filing continues to give notice.  But notice is frustrated if 
the out-of-state relocation involves a natural person, or an 
organization other than a registered organization (e.g., a general 
partnership), because the proper place to file a financing 
statement is the state in which the debtor has its principal 
residence or place of business, respectively.114  The financing 
statement will remain effective, but only until the end of the 
four-month period following the relocation; thereafter, the 
financing statement is ineffective.115 
The debtor’s change in the use of its property which converts 
collateral (e.g., “inventory”) to non-collateral (e.g., “equipment”) 
has no effect on the continued effectiveness of the financing 
statement (which lists “inventory” but not “equipment” as 
collateral).116 
The debtor’s sale of assets to an in-state purchaser has no 
impact on the original filing.  The debtor’s sale of assets to an 
 
112 See § 9-102(a)(70) (defining “registered organization”) and cmt. 11 (listing 
corporations, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships as examples). 
113 See §§ 9-301(1) (indicating that “while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the 
local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection”);; 9-307(e) (stating that a registered 
organization “organized under the law of a State is located in that State”). 
114 See §§ 9-301(1); 9-307(b)(1) (individuals), (2) (organizations with one place of 
business).  If the debtor is an organization with multiple business locations, the debtor is 
located in the state of its “chief executive office.”  § 9-307(b)(3) and cmt. 2 (defining “chief 
executive office” as “the place from which the debtor manages the main part of its 
business operations or other affairs” and “is the place where persons dealing with the 
debtor would normally look for credit information”). 
115 § 9-316(a)(2).  If the four-month period ends after the standard five-year period of 
effectiveness, then the out-of-state relocation renders the financing statement ineffective 
at the end of that five-year period.  § 9-316(a) (stating that perfection continues “until the 
earlie[r] of:  (1) the time perfection would have ceased under the law of that jurisdiction; 
[and] (2) the expiration of four months after a change of the debtor’s location to another 
jurisdiction”). 
116 § 9-507(b) (indicating that, unless either the debtor has changed its name or the 
facts involve a “new debtor” and application of § 9-508, “a financing statement is not 
rendered ineffective if, after the financing statement is filed, the information provided in 
the financing statement becomes seriously misleading”).  See also § 9-338 cmt. 3 (“Except 
as provided in Section 9-507 with respect to changes in the debtor’s name, an otherwise 
effective financing statement does not become ineffective if the information contained in it 
becomes inaccurate.”). 
Implicit in the analysis is the assumption that the property is never subject to a 
certificate-of-title law.  A financing statement will perfect a security interest in a dealer’s 
inventory of motor vehicles.  § 9-311(d).  If, however, the dealer converts one of the 
vehicles to in-house use as equipment, the financing statement no longer perfects the 
security interest in that vehicle.  Instead, the secured party must comply with the 
certificate-of-title law.  See § 9-311 cmt. 4 (last sentence). 
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out-of-state purchaser does impact the original filing, although 
the impact is not immediate.  The underlying security interests 
in the chattel paper and accounts survive the dispositions,117 and 
the original filing continues to perfect those security interests,118 
even though a search against the purchasers will not reveal the 
filing against the seller/debtor.  The financing statement remains 
effective to perfect the security interest in the chattel paper sold 
to the in-state purchaser until the end of its standard five-year 
duration.  But the filing remains effective to perfect the security 
interest in the accounts sold to the out-of-state buyer for only one 
year.119 
All of these post-filing events frustrate the notice function in 
whole (the financing statement cannot be found) or in part (the 
filing can be found but contains incorrect information).  
Nevertheless, these examples illustrate that post-filing mischief 
never has an immediate impact on the continued effectiveness of 
the financing statement.  At best, the filing remains effective for 
the remainder of its standard five-year life; at worst, the filing 
remains effective for a grace period of either four months or one 
year.  A secured party, therefore, should periodically monitor its 
debtor’s behavior, but it has no concerns that any misbehavior 
will abruptly terminate the effectiveness of its filing.120 
So consider one more example.  Lender makes a $1 million 
loan to SmithCorp, a Texas corporation, secured by an 
enforceable security interest in SmithCorp’s current and after-
acquired inventory.  Lender files its financing statement in 
Texas.  Two years later, SmithCorp merges with and into 
WilliamsCorp, a Delaware corporation.  WilliamsCorp, the 
 
117 § 9-315(a)(1). 
118 § 9-507(a).  Nevertheless, the purchaser may have a superior claim to the chattel 
paper under § 9-330(a) or (b). 
119 § 9-316(a)(3) (stating that, unless the standard five-year life of a filing will end 
earlier and trigger application of subsection (a)(1), a security interest remains perfected 
until “the expiration of one year after a transfer of collateral to a person that thereby 
becomes a debtor and is located in another jurisdiction”);; § 9-316 cmt. 2 (observing that 
the longer one-year period (rather than a four-month period) “is necessary, because, even 
with the exercise of due diligence, the secured party may be unable to discover that the 
collateral has been transferred to a person located in another jurisdiction”).  The 
purchaser of the accounts, PrimeCo, has become a “debtor” by acquiring an interest in 
property that remains “collateral” for the debt owed by the seller to its creditor.  
§ 9-102(a)(28)(A).  PrimeCo is “located in another jurisdiction” because it is incorporated 
under the laws of a state other than the state in which the financing statement was filed 
against the seller. 
120 The central issue is whether mischief which undermines the notice function of 
the filing creates a risk that should be borne by the filer, or the searcher.  Perhaps the 
best discussion of this issue is found in PEB Commentary No. 3, dated March 10, 1990 
(reprinted in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1156–59 
(2009)), which addresses whether unauthorized asset dispositions should create a refiling 
obligation for the filer, or a title-tracing obligation for the searcher. 
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surviving entity, acquires all of SmithCorp’s assets and assumes 
all of SmithCorp’s debts.  Three months later, WilliamsCorp 
makes an inventory purchase of $100,000.  Does Lender hold a 
perfected security interest in this post-merger inventory? 
Initially, an astute student may question whether Lender 
can claim any security interest in the inventory purchased by 
WilliamsCorp, as Lender’s security agreement was with 
SmithCorp, not WilliamsCorp.  And absent a security agreement, 
no security interest exists.121  But WilliamsCorp’s acquisition of 
SmithCorp’s assets and assumption of its debts makes 
WilliamsCorp a “new debtor,”122 so SmithCorp’s security 
agreement binds WilliamsCorp and no new security agreement is 
necessary to create an enforceable security interest in the post-
merger inventory acquired by WilliamsCorp.123 
The student then addresses the question asked: Does Lender 
have a perfected security interest in the post-merger inventory?  
Lender’s filing is recorded against “SmithCorp” and will not be 
found by searching against “WilliamsCorp.”  Additionally, Lender 
filed its financing statement where SmithCorp is incorporated 
(Texas), but WilliamsCorp is incorporated in a different state 
(Delaware).  Notwithstanding these concerns, however, the 
student may logically conclude—based on earlier observations of 
the effect, if any, that post-filing mischief may have on a 
financing statement—that Lender’s filing remains effective for at 
least four months (if not longer).  The student may even cite 
§ 9-508, which states that the financing statement remains 
effective to perfect a security interest in inventory acquired by 
WilliamsCorp within four months after the merger, even though 
the difference between the name of the original debtor—
“SmithCorp”—and the new debtor—“WilliamsCorp”—renders the 
filing seriously misleading.124 
But that result is wrong, although the error is far from 
obvious. 
 
121 See § 9-203(b)(3)(A)–(D). 
122 See §§ 9-102(a)(56) (defining “new debtor” as “a person [WilliamsCorp] that 
becomes bound as debtor under Section 9-203(d) by a security agreement previously 
entered into by another person [SmithCorp]”);; 9-203(d) (stating that a “person 
[WilliamsCorp] becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another 
person [SmithCorp] if, by operation of law other than this article or by contract . . . (2) the 
person [WilliamsCorp] becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person 
[SmithCorp] . . . and acquires . . . all or substantially all of the assets of the other person 
[SmithCorp]”). 
123 See § 9-203(e) and cmt. 7. 
124 See § 9-508(b).  Lender can perfect a security interest in inventory acquired after 
the four-month period by filing a financing statement against “WilliamsCorp” in 
Delaware.  § 9-508(b)(2). 
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The four-month rule of § 9-508, codified in subsection (b) and 
paraphrased above, applies only if “a filed financing 
statement . . . is effective under subsection (a).”125  Subsection (a) 
states in relevant part: 
[A] filed financing statement naming an original debtor [SmithCorp] 
is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral in which a new 
debtor [WilliamsCorp] has or acquires rights to the extent that the 
financing statement would have been effective had the original debtor 
[SmithCorp] acquired rights in the collateral.126 
What does the quoted language mean?  I read it as requiring the 
collateral acquired by the new debtor to fall within the 
description of the collateral found in the financing statement 
filed against the original debtor (an interpretation shared by one 
of the drafters127).  For example, a filing against SmithCorp’s 
“inventory” is effective to perfect a security interest in 
WilliamsCorp’s “inventory.”  The language cannot address any 
concern with the difference between the names of the original 
debtor (“SmithCorp”) and the new debtor (“WilliamsCorp”), 
because that matter is expressly addressed by subsection (b).  
And if the language is intended to address any jurisdictional 
differences between the original debtor (located in Texas) and the 
new debtor (located in Delaware), one might reasonably argue 
that the drafters should have—and could have—been less 
obtuse,128 especially since the difference in jurisdictions does not 
prevent the filing from remaining effective to perfect a security 
interest in the collateral transferred from the original debtor to 
the new debtor for as long as one year.129  It will be the rare 
student who reads the statutory language of § 9-508 and 
appreciates that the change in jurisdiction immediately renders 
 
125 § 9-508(b). 
126 § 9-508(a) (emphasis added). 
127 See Harry C. Sigman, The Filing System Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 61, 81 (1999) (noting that § 9-508 continues the effectiveness of a filed financing 
statement against a new debtor “to the extent that the financing statement would have 
been effective had the original debtor acquired rights in the collateral, e.g., the collateral 
falls within the indication of collateral provided in the financing statement”) (emphasis 
added); id. at 61 n.* (indicating that Mr. Sigman was the ALI representative on the 
NCCUSL Article 9 Drafting Committee). 
128 For example, subsection (a) § 9-508 could have been drafted as follows (revised 
language italicized): 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a filed financing statement 
naming an original debtor is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral 
in which a new debtor, located in the same jurisdiction as the original debtor, 
has or acquires rights to the extent that the financing statement would have 
been effective had the original debtor acquired rights in the collateral. 
Alternatively, the following sentence could have been added to the end of subsection (c):  
“This section also does not apply if the original debtor and the new debtor are located in 
different jurisdictions.” 
129 See §§ 9-508(c), 9-507(a), and 9-316(a)(3). 
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the filing ineffective to perfect a security interest in any post-
merger collateral.  But buried in the Official Comments to 
§ 9-508  is evidence of that intended result: 
Moreover, if the original debtor and the new debtor are located in 
different jurisdictions, a filing against the original debtor would not be 
effective to perfect a security interest in collateral that the new debtor 
acquires or has acquired from a person other than the original debtor.  
See Example 5, Section 9-316, Comment 2.130 
Whether confronted with the confusing language of § 9-508(a), or 
the clear message tucked away in Official Comment 4, the 
student is left to revise her earlier analysis and conclude that 
Lender’s original filing is not effective to perfect its security 
interest in any post-merger inventory acquired by WilliamsCorp. 
The foregoing analysis reveals yet another possible obstacle 
to the effective use of syllogisms in Secured Transactions.  Article 
9 occasionally adopts a rule that, for no apparent reason, yields a 
result so unexpected and inconsistent with the norm that a 
logical approach to its understanding is undermined. 
F. “If the law supposes that,” said Mr. Bumble, . . . “the law is a 
ass—a idiot.”131 
While attending the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo,132 
Socrates purchases a pair of cowboy boots for $200.133  After 
 
130 § 9-508 cmt. 4.  As Kenny Bania might exclaim, “That’s gold, Jerry!  Gold!”  See 
The Fatigues, http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheFatigues.html (last visited Oct. 24, 
2009). 
131 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 463 (The New American Library, Inc. 1961) 
(1838).  Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun is one of two members of the Supreme 
Court of the United States to drop this quote into an opinion.  See Estate of Wilson v. 
Aiken Industries, Inc., 439 U.S. 877, 880 n.3 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  (Justice 
John Paul Stevens also borrowed the line in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223–24 
n.10 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).)  Justice Blackmun took his judicial oath on June 9, 
1970, exactly one hundred years to the day of the death of Charles Dickens.  See Members 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
members.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2009); Charles Dickens Biography and Works, 
http://www.onlineliterature.com/dickens/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
132 According to its website, the HLSR is the third largest fair or festival in North 
America (the general attendance in 2009 exceeded 1.8 million) and the largest rodeo in 
the world (26,285 livestock competitions and horse show entries in 2009).  See Frequently 
Asked Questions Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, http://www.hlsr.com/about/faq.aspx 
(follow the “How does the Show impact the city?” hyperlink and the “What’s unique about 
the Houston Livestock Show?” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  Entertainers from 
“A” to “Z” have performed on its concert stages through the years, including Ashanti, Tony 
Bennett, Johnny Cash, Bill Cosby, Bob Dylan, Alicia Keys, Barry Manilow, Olivia 
Newton-John, Elvis Presley, REO Speedwagon, Randy Travis, and ZZ Top.  See 
Entertainment History Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, http://www.hlsr.com/ 
concerts/past-performers.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
133 Can you believe that someone would pay $75,000 for a pair of cowboy boots?  See 
Neal Santelmann, Most Expensive Cowboy Boots, April 4, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/ 
2006/04/03/cowboy-boots-expensive_cx_ns_0404feat.html. 
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returning to his hotel, Socrates decides to take a walk in his new 
footwear.  While waiting for a streetlight to change, a law 
enforcement officer hits the siren, jumps out of the car, and 
arrests Socrates.  Dumbfounded, Socrates asks, “What’s the 
charge, officer?”  The officer replies, “It is a misdemeanor in 
Texas to wear cowboy boots while adorned in a toga.”  And 
Socrates retorts, “Well that’s just silly.”134 
Whatever your word choice (silly, stupid, idiotic, dumb, etc.), 
some laws just make no sense.  When learning those laws, it may 
be best to park your deductive reasoning at the classroom door.  
That suggestion just may be appropriate when teaching one 
particular (and, in my opinion, “silly”) provision of Article 9.  
Consider the following hypothetical. 
Meredith, an architect, wants to buy a Steinway grand piano 
for her home.  She cannot afford to buy a new piano from her 
local Steinway dealer,135 so she has been reviewing 
advertisements posted by private owners in the weekend 
newspaper.  Meredith visits the home of one seller, whose 
recently-deceased spouse was the family musician who played for 
personal satisfaction.  After playing the piano for twenty 
minutes, she agrees to pay the asking price of $22,000 and takes 
delivery that week.  Eight months later, Friendly Finance 
contacts Meredith and informs her that it financed the seller’s 
purchase of the piano and continues to hold a perfected security 
interest in it.  Friendly Finance informs Meredith that if she does 
not pay the seller’s unpaid debt of $14,000, then Friendly 
Finance will exercise its contractual and statutory rights and 
remedies, including repossessing and selling the piano.  Meredith 
had no prior knowledge of her seller’s financing arrangement or 
Friendly Finance’s security interest.  She has no intention of 
paying $14,000 to make this problem disappear and tells 
Friendly Finance to pursue collection from her seller, who 
 
134 To my limited knowledge, Socrates has not violated any actual law.  Apparently, 
however, Texas does have (or has had) some “silly” laws.  See Stupid Texas Laws, 
http://www.idiotlaws.com/dumb_laws/texas/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
135 Steinway & Sons, formed in 1853, builds approximately 5,000 pianos each year, 
and each piano takes about one year to craft.  See Steinway Piano: Through the Years, 
May 21, 2008, http://www.articlesbase.com/music-articles/-steinway-piano-through-the-
years-421850.html.  I purchased a new Steinway baby grand piano in the mid-1990’s for 
approximately $24,000, so a new Steinway grand piano that the typical consumer would 
purchase for personal use probably costs at least $30,000–$35,000 today.  Several years 
ago, singer George Michael paid over $2 million for the upright Steinway piano on which 
John Lennon composed “Imagine.”  See Stephen M. Silverman, George Michael Buys 
Lennon Piano, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, Oct. 23, 1997, http://www.people.com/people/ 
article/0,,621306,00.html.  Readers interested in learning more about Steinway pianos 
may wish to read RONALD V. RATCLIFFE, STEINWAY (1989) or view the documentary movie 
Note by Note:  The Making of the Steinway L1037 (Plow Productions, LLC 2007). 
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received $22,000 from Meredith.  Did Meredith acquire the 
Steinway grand piano subject to, or free and clear of, Friendly 
Finance’s security interest? 
Most students will favor Meredith in this dispute.  She 
purchased the piano for a fair price, and she had no knowledge of 
the security interest.  Meredith is an innocent purchaser for 
value, so Steinway’s recourse should be limited to the seller, who 
received sales proceeds more than sufficient to pay off the 
purchase debt.136 
Sounds great, right?  That may be the result under Article 9.  
Then again, it may not.  The correct result probably will turn on 
a single factor: whether Friendly Finance filed a financing 
statement. 
As a general rule, a security interest remains effective 
against purchasers of the collateral, unless the secured party has 
authorized the sale free of (rather than subject to) its security 
interest.137  Apparently Friendly Finance did not consent to its 
debtor’s sale of the piano, so its security interest survived the 
disposition unless Article 9 provides buyers with protection. 
The primary carve outs for buyers of goods are stated in 
§ 9-320.  Subsection (a) states that “a buyer in the ordinary 
course of business . . . takes free of a security interest created by 
the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and 
the buyer knows of its existence.”138  This rule permits consumers 
and non-consumers to purchase items at Wal-Mart, Target, 
Home Depot, Barnes & Noble, and other retailers without being 
concerned that the items serve as inventory collateral and may 
be subject to superior property claims held by an unknown 
creditor.139  Meredith’s seller was not in the business of selling 
pianos, so subsection (a) offers her no protection. 
 
136 As a general rule, a creditor has an enforceable (and often perfected) security 
interest in proceeds traceable to its collateral.  See §§ 9-203(f); 9-315(a)(2), (c), (d).  See 
also § 9-102(a)(64) (defining “proceeds”). 
137 See §§ 9-201(a) (stating the general rule that “a security agreement is effective 
according to its terms . . . against purchasers of the collateral”);; 9-315(a)(1) (stating the 
general rule that “a security interest . . . continues in collateral notwithstanding 
sale . . . or other disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition 
free of the security interest”). 
138 § 9-320(a).  See also §§ 1-201(b)(9) (defining “buyer in ordinary course of 
business”);; 9 102(c) (incorporating Article 1 definitions). 
139 The buyer who is purchasing a unit of inventory may not need the protection of 
§ 9-320(a).  Many secured parties consent to inventory dispositions free and clear of their 
security interests; those security interests, then, effectively terminate at the point of sale.  
See § 9-315(a)(1).  See also § 9-320 cmt. 6 (“If the secured party authorized the sale in an 
express agreement or otherwise, the buyer takes free under Section 9-315(a) without 
regard to the limitations of this section.”). 
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But perhaps Meredith is protected by subsection (b), which 
permits her to acquire the piano free of the security interest held 
by Friendly Finance if five conditions are met.  First, her seller 
must have used the piano “primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes.”140  Rephrased, the piano must have been a 
“consumer good” in the hands of her seller.141  Meredith can prove 
this condition, as the seller’s spouse played the piano for personal 
enjoyment.  Second, Meredith must have bought the piano 
without knowledge of Friendly Finance’s security interest,142 a 
fact which she can prove.  Third, she must give “value,”143 met by 
her $22,000 payment.  Fourth, the piano must be a “consumer 
good” in Meredith’s hands.144  Meredith is an architect, not a 
professional musician, so she can satisfy this condition.  And 
fifth, Meredith must have purchased the piano before Friendly 
Finance filed a financing statement against it.145 
Subsection (b), sometimes referred to as the “garage sale” 
exception,146 applies only if the debtor sells a consumer good.  
The overwhelming number of security interests in consumer 
goods are purchase-money security interests.147 Because Friendly 
Finance financed its debtor’s purchase of the piano, which 
secures repayment of the credit extended, its security interest is 
a purchase-money security interest.148  The debtor used the piano 
as a consumer good, so the purchase-money security interest was 
automatically perfected at attachment.149  Therefore, Friendly 
Finance’s sole purpose in filing a financing statement is not to 
perfect its security interest, but to protect its security interest—
 
140 § 9-320(b). 
141 See § 9-102(a)(23) (defining “consumer goods” as “goods that are used or bought 
for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”). 
142 § 9-320(b)(1). 
143 Id. at (b)(2).  See also §§ 1-204 (defining “value” to include “any consideration 
sufficient to support a simple contract”);; 9-102(c) (incorporating definitions from Article 
1). 
144 § 9-320(b)(3). 
145 Id. at (b)(4). 
146 See WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
268 (4th ed. 2007) (observing that § 9-320(b) is “sometimes referred to as the ‘garage-sale’ 
rule”);; Robert M. Lloyd, The New Article 9:  Its Impact on Tennessee Law (Part II), 67 
TENN. L. REV. 329, 342 (2000) (noting that former § 9-307(2)—the predecessor statute to 
§ 9-320(b)—was “commonly called the ‘garage sale exception.’”).  Professor Lloyd notes the 
irony of the label: “In spite of its name, the rule is not important in the garage sale 
situation, where the lender is unlikely to try to track down its collateral.  Instead, the rule 
becomes important when consumers buy and sell big-ticket items like boats, expensive 
guns, or jewelry.”  Id. at 342. 
147 There are at least two reasons for this, one practical and the other legal.  First, 
most consumer goods have insufficient value to service any debt other than the purchase-
money debt.  Second, a secured party who claims a non-PMSI in a household good may 
incur the wrath of the Federal Trade Commission.  See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (2009). 
148 See § 9-103(a), (b). 
149 See § 9-309(1). 
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against a possible property claim asserted under § 9-320(b) by an 
unauthorized consumer purchaser of the collateral, such as 
Meredith. 
So Meredith wins if Friendly Finance did not file, but she 
loses if Friendly Finance filed. 
But why should Meredith’s victory or defeat turn on whether 
Friendly Finance filed a financing statement?  The purpose of 
filing a financing statement is to give notice of a possible security 
interest in the collateral.150  Implicit in that policy, however, is 
the premise that the party to whom notice is directed will search 
the public records and discover the filing.  But the average 
consumer who is purchasing an expensive item—from a 
neighbor, a co-worker, or a stranger, and in response to a casual 
conversation, a bulletin-board announcement, a newspaper 
advertisement, or an online solicitation—has never heard of 
U.C.C. Article 9 (I’m shocked!) or appreciate (much less know 
where and how to discover) that a financing statement (“financial 
statement?”151) may have been filed against the item.  Article 9 
should indeed resolve the potential dispute between Friendly 
Finance and Meredith, but Meredith’s victory or defeat should 
not turn on a fortuitous event whose purpose is divorced from 
reality.152 
 
150 See supra note 92. 
151 As I grade Secured Transactions exams I tell myself that the one error for which 
I will subtract points is an incorrect reference to a “financial statement” instead of a 
“financing statement.”  But then I recall that judges often make the same mistake.  See, 
e.g., HomeAlert Corp. v. Concert Co., No. 08-912, 2008 WL 5134756, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 
5, 2008) (referring to “the filing of a UCC Financial Statement Amendment”);; Whoops 
Transport, Inc. v. Blue Ribbon Commodity Traders, Inc., 2008 WL 2367213, at *1 (D. 
Puerto Rico June 6, 2008) (“Bancorp filed a financial statement concerning the security 
interest”);; Carlmont Capital Special Purpose Corp. II v. Healthcare for Women, S.C., No. 
2:07-cv-1018-RLH-GWF, 2008 WL 150372, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2008) (“HfW filed UCC-
1 financial statements”);; Heck v. Buhler, 07-21-C, 2007 WL 4256967, at *4 n.5 (M.D. La. 
Nov. 30, 2007) (“he filed his UCC-1 Financial Statement”);; U.S. v. Pinkston, SA-06-CA-
0732 OG (NN), 2007 WL 1437690, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 14, 2007) (“the government 
presented the UCC Financial Statement”);; Agriliance, L.L.C. v. Farmpro Serv., Inc., 328 
F. Supp. 2d 958, 966 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (“filed the appropriate financial statement”);; EH 
Yacht, LLC v. Egg Harbor, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 2d 556, 560 n.2 (D.N.J. 2000) (“the UCC 
financial statement”);; 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Restaurant, Inc., 614 F. 
Supp. 202, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“financial statements were timely filed”);; U.S. v. Trans-
World Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (“a financial statement filed with 
the California Secretary of State”); In re Tamis, 398 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 17, 
2008) (“The Chase security interest was perfected by the recordation of a UCC-1 financial 
statement”);; 1st Bank v. Winderl, 60 P.3d 998, 999 (Mont. 2002) (“two financial 
statements filed in 1990 and 1994”);; LBM, Inc. v. Rushmore State Bank, 543 N.W.2d 780, 
785 (S.D. 1996) (“a valid and filed financial statement”);; Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 
883 S.W.2d 415, 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (“filed financial statements”);; Simmons Oil 
Corp. v. Holly Corp., 796 P.2d 189, 197 (Mont. 1990) (“Holly filed UCC financial 
statements in Montana.”). 
152 See Linda J. Peltier, Buyers of Used Goods and the Problem of Hidden Security 
Interests:  A New Proposal to Modify Section 9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 
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The preceding discussion illustrates that Article 9 
occasionally adopts a rule that appears to be so illogical as to 
render futile any attempt to understand it logically.  And illogical 
rules can frustrate the ability to learn the core principles in a 
Secured Transactions course through syllogisms. 
G.  “There is no exception to the rule that every rule has an 
exception.”153 
Socrates and legendary actor Clark Gable are discussing the 
“leap year” phenomenon.  Clark is a reluctant participant, given 
that on February 29, 1940, he failed to win the Oscar for Best 
Actor for his portrayal of Rhett Butler in Gone With The Wind.154  
 
HASTINGS L.J. 215, 253 n.164 (1985) (observing that “the outcome under § 9-307(2) [the 
predecessor statute to § 9-320(b)] would seem more dependent upon fortuity than 
reason”). 
153 James Thurber (1894-1961).  See James Thurber Quotes, http://www.brainy 
quote.com/quotes/authors/j/james_thurber_3.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  Thurber 
had two brothers, one of whom shot James in the eye with an arrow during a game of 
“William Tell,” leading to blindness in that eye.  See The Thurber House, 
http://www.thurberhouse.org/james/james.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  Almost ninety 
years earlier, another little boy—who later became famous throughout the world—had an 
eye accident.  The boy was only three years old when he entered the workshop of his 
father, a harness maker.  As he had seen his father do on many occasions, the boy took a 
sharp tool and tried to cut a piece of leather.  The tool slipped and entered his eye.  The 
injured eye became infected, and the infection spread to his other eye, leaving the boy 
blind.  But his blindness led him, at the age of fifteen, to develop a system of 
communication that has been used by millions of blind people to read and write.  The 
little boy’s name?  Louis Braille.  See A New Method: The Story of Louis Braille, http:// 
louisbrailleschool.org/resources/louis-braille/louis-braille-childhood/ (last visited Oct. 21, 
2009). 
154 The award went to Robert Donat, for his portrayal of a shy “classics” teacher at 
an English boarding school, in Goodbye, Mr. Chips.  See 1939 Academy Awards Winners 
and History, http://www.filmsite.org/aa39.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  Gone With 
The Wind did win several other Academy Awards, including the award for Best Picture, 
Best Director (Victor Fleming), Best Actress (Vivien Leigh), Best Screenplay, and Best 
Supporting Actress (Hattie McDaniel, the first African-American nominee and winner).  
Gone With the Wind (1939), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0031381/awards (last visited Oct. 
21, 2009).  The film is the earliest of only four films to win the awards for Best Picture, 
Best Director, Best Actress, and Best Screenplay and not capture the award for Best 
Actor.  The other three films are:  Mrs. Miniver (Walter Pigeon was nominated but lost to 
James Cagney in Yankee Doodle Dandy) (see 1942 Academy Awards Winners and History, 
http://www.filmsite.org/aa42.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009)); Annie Hall (Woody Allen 
was nominated but lost to Richard Dreyfuss in The Goodbye Girl) (see 1977 Academy 
Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite.org/aa77.html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2009)); and Terms of Endearment (Jack Nicholson was nominated for, and won, the Oscar 
for Best Supporting Actor; the Oscar for Best Actor was awarded to Robert Duvall in 
Tender Mercies) (see 1983 Academy Awards Winners and History, http://www.filmsite. 
org/aa83.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009)).  Twelve films have captured the awards for 
Best Picture, Best Director, Best Actor, and Best Screenplay but not the award for Best 
Actress:  The Best Years Of Our Lives, On The Waterfront (although Eva Marie Saint won 
the Oscar for Best Supporting Actress), The Bridge On The River Kwai, A Man For All 
Seasons, Patton, The French Connection, Kramer vs. Kramer (although Meryl Streep won 
the Oscar for Best Supporting Actress), Gandhi, Amadeus, Rain Man, Forrest Gump, and 
American Beauty.  See Oscar's Greatest Films and Sweeps and its Most Surprising Loser, 
Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/560801/oscars_greatest_films_ 
and_-sweeps_-and.html?cat=37.  Only three films in the history of the Academy Awards 
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Socrates states the general rule: a year divisible by four, such as 
1960 and 2004, is a leap year.  “So 1900 was a leap year, too,” 
suggests Clark.  “No,” says Socrates.  “The general rule is subject 
to an exception: a year divisible by 100 is not a leap year.”  Clark 
replies, “Then 2000 was not a leap year.”  “Sorry, no,” says 
Socrates.  “A year divisible by 400 is a leap year.”155  Clark, 
expressing some annoyance, responds, “So your general rule is 
subject to an exception, which itself is subject to an exception.”  
“Right!” exclaims Socrates.  “What do you think of that?”  To 
which Clark retorts, “Frankly, my dear, . . . .”156 
When rules are subject to a myriad of exceptions, crafting 
the major premise of a syllogism becomes challenging.  “All men 
are mortal” is a premise much easier to master than “All men are 
mortal, other than any male who (i) is a Southern Baptist with a 
law degree from BYU; (ii) teaches commercial law; (iii) follows 
the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team; (iv) enjoys playing the 
piano; (v) favors novels authored by Harlan Coben, Pat Conroy, 
Jeff Shaara, and Daniel Silva; and (vi) has two beautiful 
daughters and a ‘Proverbs 31’ wife.”157  To a great extent, Article 
9 raises the same concern: drawing a major premise from its 
rules can be difficult because many of its rules are riddled with 
exceptions.  In fact, some variation of the phrase—”except as 
otherwise provided in subsection [x]”—appears more than 100 
times in its text!158 
 
have captured the so-called “grand slam,” winning the Oscar for Best Picture, Best 
Director, Best Actress, Best Actor, and Best Screenplay:  It Happened One Night, One 
Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest, and The Silence Of The Lambs.  Id. 
155 For a general discussion of the leap year phenomenon, see Burkald Polster & 
Marty Ross, Leaping to conclusions, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au/ 
news/education-news/leaping-to-conclusions/2008/02/29/1204226993941.html. 
156 The full quote—“Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn.”—comes in at #1 on the 
American Film Institute’s list of “AFI’s 100 Years . . . 100 Movie Quotes.”  See 
http://connect.afi.com/site/DocServer/quotes100.pdf?docID=242 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  
Two other lines from Gone With The Wind also made the list:  “After all, tomorrow is 
another day!” (#31) and “As God is my witness, I’ll never be hungry again.” (#59).  Id.  
Casablanca has the most lines on the list (six).  Id. 
157 Hey, I guess I must be immortal! 
158 See §§ 9-105(1), 9-108(a), 9-108(b), 9-108(b)(3), 9-108(b)(6), 9-108(d), 9-109(a), 
9-201(a), 9-202, 9-203(b), 9-204(a), 9-207(a), 9-207(b), 9-207(c), 9-209(a), 9-301 (preamble), 
9-301(1), 9-301(3), 9-305(a), 9-307(b), 9-307(f), 9-308(a), 9-309(1), 9-310(a), 9-311(a), 
9-311(b), 9-311(c), 9-312(b), 9-312(b)(2), 9-313(a), 9-315(a), 9-316(d), 9-317(a)(2), 9-317(b), 
9-317(c), 9-317(e), 9-319(a), 9-320(a), 9-320(b), 9-322(a), 9-322(c), 9-322(d), 9-323(a), 
9-323(b), 9-323(d), 9-323(f), 9-324(a) (twice), 9-324(b) (twice), 9-324(d) (twice), 9-324(f) 
(twice), 9-325(a), 9-327(2), 9-327(3), 9-328(2), 9-330(c), 9-330(d), 9-334(d), 9-334(h), 
9-335(c), 9-336(e), 9-340(a), 9-340(b), 9-341, 9-401(a), 9-403(b), 9-403(f), 9-404(b), 9-406(d), 
9-406(f), 9-407(a), 9-407(b), 9-408(a), 9-501(a), 9-502(b), 9-506(b), 9-507(b), 9-508(a), 
9-512(b), 9-513(d) (twice), 9-514(a), 9-514(b), 9-515(a), 9-515(b), 9-515(e), 9-516(a), 
9-519(c), 9-525(a), 9-525(b), 9-601(a), 9-601(d), 9-601(g), 9-602, 9-611(b), 9-612(a), 9-620(a), 
9-625(c), 9-626(a)(3), 9-702(a), 9-702(b), 9-703(b), 9-705(c), and 9-707(c).  As used in the 
context of an exception, the phrase “subject to” also appears several times.  See 
§§ 9-306(a), 9-322(d), 9-322(f), 9-324(b), 9-324(d), 9-326(a), 9-403(e), 9-404(b), 9-404(c), 
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Take, for example, the general rule that resolves priority 
disputes between two perfected secured creditors: priority is 
awarded to the secured party who first files its financing 
statement or otherwise perfects its security interest (whichever is 
earlier).159  Given that a security interest in almost all forms of 
collateral can be perfected by a financing statement,160 the 
practical effect is that the rule awards priority to the party who 
files first.  The statute clearly warns the reader that the rule is 
subject to other exceptions found either in § 9-322161 or elsewhere 
in Part 3 of Article 9.162 
So consider the following, and rather typical, scenario.  
Lender makes a $2 million loan on July 20163 to BizCorp, a Texas 
corporation that sells and leases office and residential furniture 
through its stores located in Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio.  
To secure repayment, BizCorp executes on that date a written 
security agreement that grants to Lender a security interest in 
BizCorp’s “accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, 
deposit accounts, documents, equipment, general intangibles, 
instruments, inventory, investment property, and letter-of-credit 
rights.”  The security agreement includes an after-acquired 
property clause and a future advance clause, and it additionally 
describes the commercial tort claims that exist on July 20.164  
Lender files its financing statement (accurate and complete in all 
respects and authorized by BizCorp) on July 20.  A few days 
later, Lender’s counsel receives a U.C.C. search report from the 
Texas Secretary of State dated July 30, showing no filings 
 
9-405(c), 9-406(a), 9-406(b), 9-406(c), 9-406(d), 9-406(f), 9-406(g), 9-406(h), 9-502(a), 
9-512(a) (twice), 9-604(b), 9-604(c), and 9-625(b). 
159 § 9-322(a)(1). 
160 Notable exceptions include collateral subject to perfection requirements stated in 
other state or federal law (e.g., motor vehicles which require lien notation on the 
certificate of title), deposit accounts and letter-of-credit rights (control only), and money 
(possession only).  See §§ 9-311(a), 9-312(b). 
161 See § 9-322(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section . . . .”). 
162 See § 9-322(f)(1) (stating that the general rule of subsection (a) is “subject 
to . . . the other provisions of this part”). 
163 July 20 is one of the most notable dates in world history.  Neil Armstrong took 
mankind’s first steps on the moon on July 20, 1969.  Also on that date I celebrated my 
tenth birthday, an event of considerably less importance (except, perhaps at the time, to 
me). 
Twenty-one years later, on July 20, 1990, William J. Brennan, Jr., concluded his 
distinguished career as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States.  
See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtusgov/ 
about/members.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
164 See § 9-108(e)(1) (stating that a reference to a “commercial tort claim” without 
additional language “is an insufficient description”).  Notwithstanding the inclusion of an 
after-acquired property clause, future commercial tort claims will not be part of the 
collateral.  See § 9-204(b)(2). 
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against BizCorp other than Lender’s financing statement.  
BizCorp has no other secured debt or secured creditors. 
Relying on the baseline “first to file or perfect” rule, a 
student may conclude that BizCorp has, and will continue to 
have, priority in all of the collateral in which a security interest 
may be perfected by filing. 
But that conclusion is riddled with exceptions, including the 
following: 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any future “buyer in the ordinary course of business” 
who claims the benefits afforded to such a party by § 9-320(a); 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any future secured party claiming the superpriority 
status afforded to purchase-money security interests under 
§ 9-324; 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any secured party claiming priority under § 9-325 in 
future collateral acquired by BizCorp; 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any secured party claiming priority under § 9-326 in 
collateral transferred by BizCorp to a “new debtor;” 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any future secured party claiming an enforceable 
security interest in investment property perfected by control 
(§ 9-328(1)); 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any future “purchaser” who enjoys the benefits afforded 
to such a party by § 9-330; 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any future “holder” or “purchaser” who enjoys the 
benefits afforded to such a party by § 9-331; 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any future “transferee” who enjoys the benefits afforded 
to such a party by § 9-332; 
 Lender’s security interest may not enjoy priority in a dispute 
with any future creditor claiming a “possessory lien” under 
§ 9-331; and 
 Lender’s security interest in collateral acquired by BizCorp 
more than four months after it makes a seriously misleading 
name change may become unperfected and lose priority 
unless Lender timely refiles (§ 9-507(c)). 
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No doubt there are others,165 but the exceptions listed above are 
sufficient in number to illustrate the difficulty of stating a 
general rule in a manner that acknowledges its exceptions. 
The preceding discussion illustrates another possible 
obstacle to the effective use of syllogisms in Secured 
Transactions.  Article 9 occasionally adopts a rule that is subject 
to one or more exceptions.  And a rule stripped of its exceptions 
may, when stated as a major premise, lead to an incorrect legal 
conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Aldisert and his co-authors have called for a renewed 
emphasis on deductive reasoning in the classroom, with special 
attention given to the syllogism.  Syllogistic reasoning requires 
the audience to craft a major premise (usually a legal rule) and a 
minor premise (often a statement of fact), and then draw from 
those two premises a conclusion.  Students often find that 
correctly stating the legal rule can be quite challenging, but 
imperative to reaching a sound conclusion.  That challenge 
dissipates in a statutory course, such as Secured Transactions, 
where the rules are codified.  Perhaps more than many law 
school courses, then, Secured Transactions is a course in which 
the syllogism can be a useful learning tool in introducing, 
analyzing, and mastering the intricacies of Article 9.  But, as 
illustrated in the preceding pages, Article 9 itself hinders the 
effective use of syllogistic reasoning. 
Given these statutory roadblocks, then, should those of us 
who have been anointed to teach Secured Transactions simply 
dismiss Judge Aldisert’s plea for more deductive reasoning in our 
classroom?  Absolutely not.  Notwithstanding these codified 
quirks, many of the legal issues introduced in the course can 
indeed be examined and resolved through syllogistic analysis.  
But that is a topic for another day—and a companion article.166 
 
165 For example, the secured party may be concerned about the scope of its priority 
when the competing claimant is the Internal Revenue Service, a topic which I have 
explored in previous articles.  See Timothy R. Zinnecker, Resolving Priority Disputes 
Between the IRS and the Secured Creditor Under Revised UCC Article 9:  And the Winner 
is . . . ?, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921–66 (2002); Timothy R. Zinnecker, When Worlds Collide:  
Resolving Priority Disputes Between the IRS and the Article Nine Secured Creditor, 63 
TENN. L. REV. 585–688 (1996). 
166 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
